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DOES LOCHNER LIVE IN LUXEMBOURG?: AN ANALYSIS
OF THE PROPERTY RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE
Michael R Antinori*
INTRODUCTION
The property rights jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme
Court ("Court") in the early twentieth century suppressed funda-
mental values of the U.S. constitutional order.1 The U.S. Consti-
tution explicitly promises individuals the right to be free from
majoritarian interferences with their property.2 In direct contra-
diction to this principle,3 the U.S. constitutional system recog-
nizes that the People, exercising sovereign law making authority,
can regulate private property for a publicly conceived common
good.' Instead of heeding the popular call for economic re-
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Fordham University.
1. James Kainen, The Historical Framework for Reviving Constitutional Protection for
Property and Contract Rights, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 87, 88 (1992).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 ("No State shall pass any Law impairing the Obliga-
tions of Contracts"); U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 2 ("nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law"); U.S. CONsT. amend. V
("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation"); see
Lucas v. So. Carolina Coastal Commission, 505 U.S. 125 (1992) (looking to Fifth
Amendment of U.S. Constitution as source of economic rights); see also Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (looking to Fourteenth Amendment as source of economic
rights).
3. Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture,
66 N.Y.U. L. Rlv. 273, 273 (1991) ("From the nation's beginning until the present,
American legal discourse about property has been dialectic. That is, at any given mo-
ment, the concept of property has contained elements that conflict with, if not contra-
dict, one another."); James L. Oakes, 'Property Rights' in Constitutional Analysis Today, 56
WASH. L. REv. 583, 583 (1981) ("[T]he very philosophic concepts underlying 'property
rights,' if they are not mutually conflicting, at least constitute a spectrum of relation-
ships between the individual and the state which secures those rights."); Frank
Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1097, 1110 (1981)
("[We] are dealing with 'two conflicting American ideals,' both reflected in the Consti-
tution: 'the protection of popular government on the one hand' and the protection of
property rights on the other.").
4. Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long recognized,
some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power."); Lucas, 505 U.S. at 165-67 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Blackmun notes that
historically, states have enjoyed a good measure of freedom in regulating private prop-
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form, the Lochner-era Court elevated individual rights at the ex-
pense of popular sovereignty. 5
The decline of Lochner-era jurisprudence was caused by a
critique that exposed the illegitimacy of property rights jurispru-
dence that failed to accommodate the disparate constitutional
values. 6 According to the advocates of this critique, a jurispru-
dential doctrine that is not moored in the U.S. Constitution
floats on the tides of dominant judicial predilection.7 Further,
constitutional property rights were the guise under which judi-
cial officers usurped the powers of legislative majorities and im-
plemented their policy preferences into the economy. 8
This critique can serve as a reference in critically examining
the property rights jurisprudence of the European Court of Jus-
tice ("ECJ"). 9 The ECJ's jurisprudence threatens the current
structure of the European Community ("EC" or "Community")
legal system established under the EC Treaty.1" To date, the ECJ
has only protected individual property rights against infringe-
ment by the political institutions of the Community.1' If, how-
ever, the ECJ were to review Member State legislation, economic
policy decision-making powers could be inappropriately shifted
erty. Id. Thus, states in the 19th century often took property for public uses without
paying compensation. Id. at 165. It was recognized that "citizens were bound to con-
tribute as much of [land], as by the laws of the country, were deemed necessary for the
public convenience." Id. (quoting M'Clenachan v. Curwin, 3 Yeates 362, 373 (Pa.
1802). Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century, states enjoyed almost un-
bounded regulatory powers over private property. Id.
5. Kainen, supra note 1, at 92; Frank Michelman, Property as a Constitutional Right;
38 WASH. & LEE L REv. 1097, 1101 (1981).
6. Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
IowA L. REv. 1319, 1350 (1987).
7. Kainen, supra note 1, at 92.
8. Id.
9. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role
of the European Court ofJustice in the Protecion of Fundamental Human Rights within the Legal
Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REv. 1103, 1128 (1986) (discussing prop-
erty rights jurisprudence of ECJ).
10. See Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, [1992] 1
C.M.L.R. 573 [hereinafter EC Treaty], incorporating changes made by Treaty on European
Union, Feb. 7, 1992, O.J. C 224/1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719, 31 I.L.M. 247 [herein-
after TEU]. The TEU, supra, amended the Treaty Establishing the European Economic
Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-II)
[hereinafter EEC Treaty], as amended by Single European Act, O.J. L 169/1 (1987),
[1987] 2 C.M.L.R. 741 [hereinafter SEA], in TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES (EC Off'l Pub. Off. 1987).
11. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1136-41.
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from the Member States to the ECJ.12 In light of this possibility,
the ECJ must establish a firm grounding for its jurisprudence to
preserve its integrity as an institution of law as opposed to poli-
tics. 1
3
This Note examines the ECJ's property rights case law in
light of the theoretical challenges to the U.S. Supreme Court's
jurisprudence of the Lochner-era. Part I discusses the ECJ's
methodology in fundamental rights cases and Member State
constitutional traditions with respect to individual property
rights from which the ECJ draws its norms. Part II analyzes the
U.S. Supreme Court's Lochner-era jurisprudence and the criti-
cism that caused its demise. Part II also studies a proposed solu-
tion to the difficulties ofjudicial enforcement of property rights.
Part III argues that if the ECJ were to adjudicate Member State
legislation under a politicized judge-made property rights norm,
similar to the U.S. Supreme Court's Lochner-era jurisprudence,
then the citizens of the Member States would be denied the
right to determine economic conditions within their national
borders. This Note concludes that the ECJ should not entertain
the possibility of incorporating Community-defined property
rights against Member States.
I. THE PROTECTION OF PROPERTY IN THE
EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
European constitutional theory pertaining to individual
property rights contains two important elements that distinguish
it from its U.S. counterpart.'4 Constitutional traditions and prac-
tices of the EC Member States and the relevant textual provi-
sions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
12. See Kainen, supra note 1, at 91-92 (discussing U.S. Supreme Court's jurispru-
dence of early twentieth century as sharp limitation on competence of states to regulate
economy).
13. See generaly Weiler, supra note 9 (discussing fundamental rights jurisprudence
of ECJ in light of principles and politics).
14. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICA. Dis-
COURSE 32 (1991) [hereinafter GLENDON I]; see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights in Twentieth-
Century Constitutions, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1992) [hereinafter Glendon II] (compar-
ing U.S. welfare state with other liberal democratic welfare states); Mary Ann Glendon,
Comment on Part 4, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE - A GER-
MAN-AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 283 (Paul Kirchhof & Donald P. Kommers eds., 1989) [here-
inafter Glendon III] (comparing individual property rights in United States with prop-
erty rights in Germany).
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Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 15 ("Convention") illustrate
these distinguishing features of European property rights ideol-
ogy.16 First, in the Member State constitutions as well as the pro-
visions of the Convention, 7 the societal right to regulate private
property"' is as important a constitutional value as the individual
right to property. 9 Conversely, the U.S. Constitution only rec-
ognizes the individual's right to property, 2° and the societal right
to regulate private property is a judicially-imposed limit on an
otherwise absolute individual right.21 Second, in the United
States, individual property rights are understood as an anti-redis-
tributive principle encompassing so-called negative rights to be
free from government interferences with individual property.22
Welfare is given as a matter of legislative grace. 8 In Europe,
15. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention] Proto-
col No. 1 to the European Convention, Mar. 20, 1952, 213 U.N.T.S. 262 [hereinafter
Protocol No. 1] (adding rights to property, education, and vote). Article 1 of that Pro-
tocol provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the right of
a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of prop-
erty in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes
or other contributions or penalties.
Id. art. 1, 213 U.N.T.S. at 262.
16. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 32-40.
17. Protocol No. 1, supra note 15, 213 U.N.T.S. 262.
18. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 14(2) (Ger.); COSTrruZIONE [Consti-
tution] art. 42(2) (Italy); BUNRACHT NA HEIREANN [Constitution] art. 43(2)(2) (Ir.).
19. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1128.
20. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("nor shall any State deprive any person of... prop-
erty without due process of law"); U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation").
21. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) ("As long recog-
nized, some values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police
power.").
22. Jackson v. City of Joilet, 715 F.2d 1200, 1203 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1049 (1983).
[The U.S. Constitution] is a charter of negative rather than positive liberties
.... The men who wrote the Bill of Rights were not concerned that Govern-
ment might do too little for the people but that it might do too much to them.
The Fourteenth Amendment, adopted in 1868 in the height of laissez-faire
thinking, sought to protect Americans from oppression by state government,
not to secure them basic government services.
23. Id.
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property rights are understood not only as an anti-redistributive
principle but also as a distributive principle encompassing a posi-
tive right to claims upon government for minimum levels of sub-
sistence.24 The welfare rights of citizens are given constitutional
status.25  Drawing on European constitutional property rights
traditions and the provisions of the Convention, the ECJ has de-
veloped norms for protecting individual property rights.26
A. Fundamental Rights Jurisprudence of the ECJ
EC citizens are not protected against infringing Community
legislation by a textual catalogue of individual rights.27 In the
European Community, unlike the United States, individual
rights are not formally expressed in a bill of rights.2 8 Further,
under the doctrine of supremacy, the ECJ has asserted that Com-
munity legislation takes precedence over Member State constitu-
tions.2 19 If Community legislation conflicts with the fundamental
24. David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHi. L. REv.
864, 867 (1986).
25. See Glendon II, supra note 14, at 521 (noting that constitutions of most liberal
democracies, with exception of United States, contain language establishing welfare
rights).
26. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1125-29.
27. GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGER J. GOEBEL, WILLIAM J. DAVEY, ELEANOR M. Fox,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNrry LAW 142-49 (1993).
28. See id. (discussing basic rights in European Community and lack of formal bill
of rights). For an argument that the EC is moving toward adoption of a bill of rights,
see Mary F. Dominick, Toward a Community Bill of Rights: The European Community Charter
of Fundamental Social Rights, 14 FoRDAmM INT'L L.J. 639 (1991).
29. Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und Vorratsstelle Fur Ge-
treide Und Futtermittel, Case 11/70, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, [1972] C.M.L.R. 225. In Inter-
nationale Handelgesellschaft, the ECJ held:
Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have
an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The valid-
ity of such measures can only be judged in light of Community law. In fact,
the law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, cannot be-
cause of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however
framed, without being deprived of its character as Community law and without
the legal basis of the Community itself being called into question. Therefore
the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State can-
not be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights
as formulated by the constitution of that or the principles of a national consti-
tutional structure.
Id. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283.
The German Constitutional Court did not originally accept the principle enunci-
ated by the Eq. Internationale Handelgesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- Und Vorratsstelle
Fur Getreide Und Futtermittel (Federal. Constitutional Court, Second Senate, May 29,
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rights guaranteed to citizens under the Member State constitu-
tions, the Community legislation may not be adjudged unconsti-
tutional by either Member State courts or the ECJ.3 °
To make up for this perceived deficiency in the Community
legal order, the ECJ expressed a commitment to safeguard indi-
vidual rights against potentially infringing Community legisla-
tion.-" In a series of decisions, the ECJ has established that fun-
damental rights form an integral part of the Community legal
order.32 The ECJ has made clear that it will review Community
legislation to prohibit violations of these fundamental rights.3 3
1974) Case 2 BvL 52/71, 37 BVerfGE 271, [1974] 2 CMLR 540 (1974). The German
Constitutional Court held:
As long as the integration process has not progressed so far that Community
law also receives a catalogue of fundamental rights decided on by a parliament
and of settled validity, which is adequate in comparison with the catalogue of
fundamental rights contained in the Constitution, a reference by a court in
the Federal Republic of Germany to the [German Constitutional Court] fol-
lowing the obtaining of a ruling of the [ECJ], is admissible and necessary if the
German court regards the rule of Community law which is relevant to its deci-
sion as inapplicable in the interpretation given by the European Court, be-
cause and in so far as it conflicts with one of the fundamental rights in the
Constitution.
Id. at 554.
30. Internationale Handelgesetschaft, (1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283.
Due to the doctrine of supremacy, Member State courts are powerless to strike down
the legislation in vindication of the rights enshrined in their constitutions. See BER-
mANN ET At., supra note 27, at 192-202 (discussingdoctrine of supremacy). The ECJ,
likewise, originally refused to strike down Community legislation on the grounds that
the legislation violated rights enshrined in the Member State constitution. Internatio-
nale Handelgesellschafl, [1970] E.C.R. at 1134, [1972] C.M.L.R. at 283.
31. Id. In the 1969 case, Strauderv. City of Ulm, the ECJ first announced fundamen-
tal human rights, enshrined in the general principles of Community law, that would be
protected by the Court. Strauder v. City of Ulm, Socialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R.
419, [1970] C.M.L.R. 112. For an argument that the Eq, in protecting individual
rights, was not motivated by a benevolent interest in human rights, see Weiler, supra
note 9, at 1110. Weiler argues that the Court anticipated serious threats to the doctrine
of supremacy by Member State courts over alleged violations of human rights by the
Community. Id. Thus, the Court of Justice began protecting human rights to quiet
opposition to the doctrine of supremacy. Id. at 1121.
32. See, e.g., Stauder, [1969] E.C.R. at 419, [1970] C.M.L.R. at 112 (interpreting
provisions of Community law to avoid interference with individual rights); see also
Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfatz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42
(recognizing right to property).
33. See, e.g., Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 42 (reviewing com-
patibility of Community legislation with fundamental right to property). The ECJ, how-
ever, has yet to strike down Community legislation on the basis of violation of individual
rights. See BERMANN Er AL., supra note 27, at 144-45 (discussing ECJ's fundamental
rights jurisprudence). The interesting difference with U.S. constitutionalism is that the
EC Treaty expressly gives the ECJ the power ofjudicial review of Community legislation.
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Due to the absence of a formal EC bill of rights from which
the ECJ may start its analysis, the ECJ has referred to two sources
in defining fundamental rights norms.3 4 The ECJ draws on the
constitutional traditions common to the Member States.35 In de-
fining fundamental rights norms, the ECJ examines the Member
State constitutional traditions to determine whether a common
practice concerning the right in question is evident.36 The EGJ
also draws on international human rights treaties on which the
Member States have collaborated. 7 The ECJ incorporates the
common constitutional tradition and any applicable provisions
from human rights treaties into the Community legal order.38
Thus, the ECJ protects fundamental rights that emanate not
from Member State law or international treaties but from Com-
munity law.3 9 The ECJ, through its jurisprudence, has estab-
lished a judge-made bill of rights that functions as Community
Law.40 The right to property is one of the rights included in this
bill of rights. 41 Of the fundamental rights protected by the ECJ,
the right to property is the most vulnerable to violation by Com-
munity legislation because the authority of the Community is
Id. The purpose of giving the ECJ the power ofjudicial review was to protect against
abuses of authority by Community institutions. Id. On the other hand, the U.S. Consti-
tution does not expressly give the federal courts the power to review legislation. U.S.
CONST. The Supreme Court, however, established the power ofjudicial review in Mar-
bury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
34. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1125-29.
35. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3745, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65.
36. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1125-29.
37. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R. at 3745, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65. The most relevant
treaty, and in fact the treaty to which the ECJ has referred, is the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Convention, supra
note 15, at 221; BERMANN ET AL., supra note 27, at 147.
38. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1125-29.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1137.
41. Hauer, [1979] E.C.R at 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 42. An interesting compari-
son with U.S. constitutionalism, is that in the United States, economic rights receive less
protection than personal rights, such as privacy. Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(evidencing high level ofjudicial review of legislation that infringes individual privacy)
woith Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (evidencing low level
of judicial review of legislation that infringes economic rights).
The ECJ, however, has not evidenced a difference in the level of protection that it
applies to economic and personal rights. Compare Oyowe and Traore v. Commission,
Case C-100/88, [1989] E.C.R. 4285 (protecting freedom of speech) with Hauer, [1979]
E.C.R. at 3727, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 42 (protecting property rights). In both cases, the
ECJ applied the same level of scrutiny to Community legislation regardless of whether
the claimed infringement was of the right to property or the right to free speech.
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strongest in the area of economic regulation.4"
B. Member State Constitutional Traditions
Member state constitutions generally recognize the individ-
ual right to be free from certain types of government interfer-
ence with private property.43 In European tradition, however,
property functions as more than a barrier that separates the indi-
vidual from the community and its actions.44 Recognizing that
individuals are rooted in, and part of, larger communities, Euro-
pean constitutions define private property in terms of its social
function.4" This gives constitutional status to societal rights to
regulate property for the common good.46 European constitu-
tions, thus, counter-pose individual rights to be free from gov-
ernment intrusions with community rights to regulate property
for the common good 7.4  Further, many European constitutions
explicitly declare that the governments they create are welfare
states4" which entitles individuals to call upon the government to
affirmatively achieve social justice through necessary levels of
wealth redistribution.49 In a constitutionally declared welfare
42. See Weiler, supra note 9, at 1121 (noting that "property rights... which [are] a
part of the living matrix of Community activity... may be considered more typical
[case of violation of individual rights by the Community] than the odd case on religious
freedom").
43. Id. at 38 (noting that idea of pre-political individual rights came to have wide
appeal in Europe); Weiler, supra note 9, at 1128.
44. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 39. Glendon notes that European thought is
committed to the notion that law can and should make good citizens of the individuals
who compose society. Id. at 86. This is an entirely different vision of law than the one
that undergirds strong commitment to individual rights. Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1685, 1713-16 (1989). That vision
supposes that there is no objective measure of the 'good life' and any attempt to turn
citizens into good citizens will ultimately reflect the interests of a dominant social
group. Id. The function of individual rights is to define a sphere of autonomy so the
individual can live out their own version of the good life. Id.
45. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 39.
46. Otto Kimminich, Property Rights, in RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONS AND IMPACT OF INTER-
NATIONAL LAW ACCORDING TO THE GERMAN BASIC LAw 75, 86 (Christian Starck ed.,
1987).
47. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1128. Weiler recognizes that some European societies
emphasize individual interests while other European societies emphasize the collective
good. Id. This collective good is recognized, not simply as a curb on individual rights
but instead as a manifestation of constitutional values that have equal weight to individ-
ual rights. Id.
48. See Glendon II, supra note 14, at 521 (discussing concept of welfare state in
Europe).
49. Id. at 524-25.
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state, individual possessive rights can never attain a level of abso-
luteness.5 0 Administering a welfare state requires the govern-
ment to redistribute property from those who are not in need to
those who are. 5 Thus, the government must balance the right
to freedom from want of some individuals with the right to free-
dom from government intrusion of other individuals.52
1. Historic Influences
While U.S. property rights ideology was infused with im-
agery of naturalness and absoluteness primarily through the writ-
ings of John Locke, European political theory was influenced
more by Jean-Jacques Rousseau."5 In contrast to Locke, Rous-
seau relegated individual possessive rights to a lower status in the
hierarchy of values of political society.54 Rousseau's writings evi-
denced a suspicion and distrust toward unmitigated pursuit of
private property.55
An element of Rousseau's thought that has influenced Eu-
ropean constitutionalism is a belief that individuals have a claim
upon their government for a minimum level of subsistence.56
50. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 32-40.
51. ERNST-WOLFGANG BOCKENFORDE, STATE, SOCIETY AND LIBERTY: STUDIES IN
POLITICAL THEORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61 (1990).
52. Gunter Durig, An Introduction to the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany,
in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 11, 20 (Ulrich Karpen ed.,
1988). The administration of the welfare state in Germany has been successful in bal-
ancing the possessive rights of some individuals and the claims for government assist-
ance of other individuals. Id. Durig notes:
Germany has to a large extent perfected the welfare state. [T] he state has not
in a power-hungary manner usurped the important role of social provision
and direction, threatening to some people. The constitution and its basic
rights ensure that the social state does not become an almighty pension state
and "welfare tyrant" which takes away all the risks but also destroys all liberty.
Id.
53. Id. at 32.
54. Id. at 34.
55. ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON INEQUALITY 76 (1984).
The first man who, having enclosed a piece of ground, bethought himself of
saying 'This is mine', and found people simple enough to believe him, was the
real founder of civil society. From how many crimes, wars, and murders, from
how many horrors and misfortunes might not any one have saved mankind, by
pulling up the stakes.., and crying to his fellows: 'Beware of listening to this
imposter; you are undone if you once forget that the fruits of the earth belong
to us all, and the earth itself to nobody.'
Id.
56. Id. Currie, supra note 24, at 867. The conviction that the government ought
to take more affirmative action to benefit the people was established early in Europe.
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While the U.S. Supreme Court during the early twentieth cen-
tury was striking down economic and social reform as unconsti-
tutional violations of individual possessive rights, European ef-
forts to create a system of government that would guarantee so-
cial justice and freedom from want began emerging.17
European efforts sought to establish affirmative obligations on
the government to provide for the needy.58
Rousseau's refusal to place individual claims to possessive
rights above societal claims to promote the public good has
played a significant part in shaping European constitutional tra-
dition.59 According to Rousseau, individual property rights
could be subordinated to community rights to regulate for a
common good.' ° The modem analogue of these notions exists
in European constitutions that define property in terms of its
social function6" implicitly recognizing community rights to reg-
ulate property for the common good.62
Only after World War II did the European political con-
sciousness turn its efforts to guaranteeing traditional possessive
property rights.63 These efforts, however, did not elevate prop-
erty rights to the exalted status that they have enjoyed in U.S.
constitutional law.64 While seeking to guarantee individual
property rights, Europeans were unwilling to entirely abandon
communitarian commitments.65 Language guaranteeing indi-
vidual property rights was, therefore, tempered by explicit recog-
Id. at 867. The French Constitution of 1791 acknowledged affirmative duties on the
state to establish a system of public assistance for the needy. Id. Further, affirmative
government action was seen as essential to individual liberty. Id. at 868; see Glendon II,
supra note 14, at 523 (discussing European commitment to notion of state obligations
to provide aid to those in need).
57. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 37.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 32-40.
60. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 34.
61. See, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 14(2) (Ger.); COSTITUZIONE [Consti-
tution] art. 42(2) (Italy); BUNRACHT NA HEIREANN [Constitution] art. 43(2) (2) (Ir.).
62. Kimminich, supra note 46, at 86.
63. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 38. Glendon notes that the abuses of human
rights before and during World War II led to a strong commitment to the notion of pre-
political individual rights. Id.
64. Id. at 39. Glendon notes that in the United States, property conjures up no-
tions of dominion and illusions of absoluteness. Id.
65. See id. at 40 (noting that Europeans "cram[med] socialist, Biblical, and feudal
notions together in the formulation of constitutional property rights").
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nition of the social element of property.66 Judicial review as a
means of enforcing individual rights was largely a new practice
in post-World War II Europe. 67 Legislative supremacy68 and an
absence of mistrust of government were the norm prior to the
1950's.69 Thus, the legislative branches were the only judge of
the compatibility of law with rights enshrined in the constitu-
tion.7° With the possible exception of Italy, Germany and Ire-
land that have strong constitutional courts, the institution of ju-
dicial review has not achieved the same level of force in guaran-
tying individual rights as it has in the United States.7'
2. The Right to Property in German Constitutional Law
The German Constitutional Court ("German Court") is one
of the strongest European courts in terms of protecting individ-
ual rights. 72 Its jurisprudence is a useful reference point for un-
derstanding European treatment of individual property rights.73
66. Id.
67. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 38.
68. Louis Favoreu,. Constitutional Review in Europe, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND
RIGHTS: THE INFLUENCE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION ABROAD 38, 44 (Louis
Henkin & AlbertJ. Rosenthal eds., 1989). Legislative supremacy also had its roots in
Rousseau who proposed that the "law is the expression of the general will." Id. The law
therefore could not be subject to outside review. Id. Only the legislature can scrutinize
or limit itself:
The legislature when making law has to examine whether the law considered
is consistent with the Constitution and resolve issues in that regard .... This
means that interpretation of the Constitution is to be left to Parliament. Be-
cause it is exercising the power of the sovereign, Parliament is the judge of the
constitutionality of its own laws. Therefore, courts are not to interpret the
Constitution; at least they do not have that power in relation to the legislature.
Id.
69. See id. at 43 ("[A]t that time [before World War II] constitutional review was
for public law like Western and American comedy for movies - an American specialty.").
70. Id. at 44.
71. See Glendon II, supra note 14, at 522 (discussing difference between the U.S.
and European models ofjudicial review); Mauro Cappelletti, The Mighty Problem ofJudi-
cial Review and the Contributions of Comparative Analysis, 2 LEGAL ISSUES OF EUROPEAN
INTEGRATION 1, 2 (1979). Cappelletti notes:
[T] he 'problem formidable' of the democratic legitimacy of relatively unaccount-
able individuals (the judges) pouring their own hierarchy of values . . . into
the relatively empty boxes of such vague concepts as liberty and equality, rea-
sonableness, fairness and due process.., has provided for centuries the justifi-
cation in Europe for a rejection ofjudicial review.
Id.
72. See Favoreu, supra note 68, at 38-59 (discussing constitutional review by courts
of various countries in Europe).
73. See generally DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
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The catalogue of individual rights in the German Constitution
("Basic Rights") reflects a balance of individual rights and com-
munity interests. 7' Recognizing the autonomous nature of indi-
viduals, the Basic Law guarantees traditional individual rights,
creating an area of freedom within which the individual does not
have to answer to society.75 These freedoms, however, carry defi-
nitional limits to individual action and must be exercised within
parameters that are set by community norms. 6 Individual rights
are thereby. infused with elements of social responsibility. 77 By
defining and, at the same time restraining, individual rights, col-
lectivity and individuality are counter-posed and balanced
against one another in the Basic Law.78
a. Background
The German constitutional system evidences commitment
to safeguarding individual property rights. 79 This commitment
is rooted in the Rechstaat (Recht, law; Staat, state) tradition of
German constitutional and political thought."0 The concept of
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 247 (1989) (discussing property rights jurisprudence of
German Court).
74. Donald P. Kommers, The Jurisprudence of Free Speech in the US. and the Federal
Republic of Germany, 53 S. CAL. L. REv. 677, 677 (1980). Kommers notes:
The Basic Law... resounds in the language of human freedom, but a freedom
restrained by certain political values, community norms, and ethical princi-
ples. Its image of man is of a person rooted in and defined by a certain kind
of human community. Yet in the German constitutionalist view the person is
also a transcendent being for more important than any collectivity. 'Thus,
there is a sense in which the Basic Law is both contractarian and communitar-
ian in its foundation: contractarian in that the Constitution carves out an area
of human freedom that neither government, private groups, nor individuals
may touch; communitarian in the sense that every German citizen is under
obligation to abide, at least in his overt behavior, by the values and principles
of the moral and political order.
Id.
75. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 249; see, e.g., GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 14
(Ger.) (guaranteeing right to property).
76. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 249; Helmut Goerlich, Fundamental Constitutional
Rights: Content, Meaning and General Doctrines, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 45, 55 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).
77. See GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 76-108 (discussing notion of responsibility as
adjunct to rights).
78. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 250.
79. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 39. Article 14 of the German Basic Law provides:
"Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed." GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution]
art. 14(1) (Ger.).
80. BOCKENFORDE, supra note 51, at 47-69.
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Rechstaat had its genesis in liberal political ideology of govern-
ment based on the rule of law."' A rule of law that would, ac-
cording to the tenets of liberalism, limit the exercise of state
power protecting the individual from the state."2 One of the
central promises of Rechtstaat is freedom from state imposed in-
terferences with individual property rights.83
In addition, Sozialstaat, the opposing concept of Rechtstaat,
has also influenced German constitutional tradition. 4 Sozial-
staat calls for a state that will look after its citizens and distribute
wealth to those in need; a state that will actively intervene in mar-
ket and social orders to counter inequality of conditions.8 5 Com-
mitment to an active state grew out of the perception that, in
reality, freedom may be restricted not only by the state but also
through factual circumstances.8 6 Unless public authorities inter-
vened by appropriate means to preserve or restore a meaningful
level of individual freedom, the guarantees of Rechtsstaat would
become empty promises for an ever increasing number of citi-
zens.87 Sozialstaat recognizes that the state can be the friend as
well as the enemy of personal freedom.88
81. Id. at 49. Bockenforde defines the basic elements of Rechtstaat as follows:
(1) Rejection of any kind of supra-personal idea or object of the state; the
state is neither something God-given nor something divinely ordained but
a 'body politic' (res publica) existing for the benefit of each and every indi-
vidual. The starting point and point of reference for the political order is
the free, equal, self-determine individual and his earthly aims in life; the
furtherance of these is the underlying ratio of the state. 'Man's transcen-
dental inclinations, morality and religion, lie beyond the competence of
the Rechtsstaat.'
(2) Restriction of the objects and functions of the state to the liberty and se-
curity" of the person and of property - that is to say, to safeguarding indi-
vidual liberty and facilitating individual self-fulfillment.
Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 60 ("[The traditional notion of Rechtsstaat] safeguards the distribu-
tions of goods rather than changing it, and through its forms and procedures it bars
direct access to private property for the purposes of social redistribution.").
84. KOMMERS, supra note 73; at 249.
85. BOCKENFOMRE, supra note 51, at 61.
86. Id.
87. Id.; see Phillip Kunig, The Principle of SocialJustice, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 187, 188-201 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988) (discussing con-
cept of social justice in German political thought). Historically, the notion that the
state can promote freedom grew out of the tendency to compensate individuals for
consequences originating from the development toward liberal individual rights. Id. at
191.
88. BOcKI nFoaE, supra note 51, at 146-73. Bockenforde notes:
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Rechtsstaat and Sozialstaat, as the dual basis for a constitu-
tional order, seem to promise unavoidable incoherence.89 It is
difficult to conceive of an order that realizes both principles at
the level of the constitution.9" Rechtsstaat is bound up with direct
and absolute guarantees of individual freedom from intervening
government measures as a matter of constitutional right.91
Equally direct, absolute guarantees of Sozialstaat to active state
assistance are not possible as a matter of constitutional right
without dismantling the guarantees provided for by Rechtsstaat. 
9 2
For example, it is difficult to commit the constitutional order to
directly enforceable individual property rights while at the same
time committing to directly enforceable rights to redistributive
state action. 93 To give to some necessarily entails taking from
others, and the two principles logically cancel each other out.94
This tension has been resolved by an intricate balancing of
the two principles.95 Alleviation of social inequalities, which is
the concern of Socialstaat, is not sought as a matter of individual
right at the constitutional level.96 While Article 20 of the Basic
law contains a descriptive statement of principle that Germany is
The resultant increase in legal regulation of individual living-relationships
does not in itself imply any abolition of individual and social liberty by the
state; it simply corresponds to the necessity, henceforth, for effectively preserv-
ing the liberty of the individual and society through and not, as before, against
an ever-denser network of social benefits and social services.
Id.
89. See id. at 62-68 (discussing tension between Sozialstaat and Rechtsstaat).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 63.
[1]f the liberty enshrined in the Rechtsstaat is not to be revoked or dismantled,
the Sozialstaat can only have the function of creating the social conditions for
realising... liberty for all, which in particular means reducing social inequal-
ity. It therefore appears to belong at the level of administration, including




95. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 249. Kommers notes that the Sozialstaat and the
Rechtstaatjoin in a higher union under the Basic Law. Id. This union, according to
Kommers, can be captured in the term sozialer Rechtsstaat, or social legal state. Id.
96. Kunig, supra note 87, at 193. According to Kommers, there are a number of
reasons, historically, why the principle was not given specificity as a constitutionally
binding force. KOMMER, supra note 73, at 250. Economic liberals preferred to define
the obligations of the social state in broad language. Id. Socialists believed that the
goals of the social state could be achieved by progressive legislation, and were content
to leave the language as a broad statement of principle. Id.
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a social state, no directly enforceable individual rights97 to redis-
tributive state action have been held to follow.9" Rather, Article
20 places an affirmative obligation on the legislature to construct
ajust social order, and the Court has often reminded the legisla-
ture of its constitutional duty.99
The Socialstaat principle of social justice operates at the
point where social conditions and market structures are created
and mandates institutions for realizing meaningful freedom for
all. 100 In this manner, the legislature is the guardian of constitu-
tional principles and the enforcer of rights that flow from those
principles."' While the Basic Law remains committed to Social-
staat, the legislature defines its substance. 10
Rechtsstaat fulfills its promise of constitutionally guaranteed
individual property rights in Article 14 of the Basic Law.10 3 Far
from being an absolute guarantee, the text of Article 14 contains
97. See Currie, supra note 24, at 869 (discussing other German Constitutional
Court judgments that recognize affirmative obligations of German government).
98. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 250-51.
99. Currie, supra note 24, at 868-71. The German Constitutional Court has, how-
ever, interpreted Article 20 as a directly enforceable norm with respect to other individ-
ual rights. Id. For example, at the same time that the U.S. Supreme Court held that
the U.S. Constitution forbade the government from outlawing abortion, Roe, 410 U.S. at
113, the German Court held that the Constitution required the government to outlaw
abortion. Id. The German Court reasoned that a fetus was a person whose life was
protected by the Basic Law guarantee of the right to life. Id. The Basic Law, the Court
declared, not only "prohibits... direct government encroachments upon the develop-
ing life, but also commands the State to safeguard it from illegal encroachments by
others." Id.
100. BOCKENFORDE, supra note 51, at 63.
101. See Thomas C. Grey, Constitutionalism: An Analytic Framework, in CONsrrru-
TIONALISM 189, 196-200 (Pennock & Chapman eds., 1979) (discussing 'political enforce-
ment' model of constitutionalism). According to Grey, a constitutional norm that nom-
inally constrains the legislature, but is subject to authoritative construction by that same
legislation is still constitutional law. Id. The legislature under such a system becomes
the enforcer of this constitutional law. Id.
102. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 250.
103. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 14 (Ger.). Article 14 provides:
1. Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed. Their content and
limits shall be determined by the laws.
2. Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public weal.
3. Expropriation shall be permitted only in the public weal. It may be ef-
fected only by or pursuant to a law which shall provide for the nature and
extent of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined by establish-
ing an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those
affected. In case of dispute regarding the amount of compensation, recourse
may be had to the ordinary courts.
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built in limits.104 First, Article 14(1) recognizes legislative power
to define the content and limits of property.' 5 Further, Article
14(2) states that the ownership of property implies individual
duties and responsibilities to society." 6 The privilege of having
one's property protected and guaranteed by the state imposes
obligations on the individual to use property for the common
good.10 7
Article 14 recognizes a dual function of property and sup-
ports both as equally important constitutional values.1 08 On the
one hand, property, as it is defined by Article 14, has an individ-
ual function by carving out an area of individual freedom; on the
other hand, Article 14 defines a social function of property as its
use should serve the common good.10 9 By collapsing the logi-
cally correlative concepts of rights and duties, Article 14 contains
seemingly incompatible principles.110
The union of rights and restraints in Article 14 provides the
framework under which the goals of Socialstaat can be pursued
by the legislature.1 1 Limitations on individual rights provide
sufficient berth for the legislature to pursue economic policies
designed to achieve social justice. 112 The legislature, in pursuing
social justice as an economic policy, can activate the social func-
tion of property by calling upon the individual's duties to use
their property in a manner that serves the common good. 13
The values embodied in Sociatstaat become ajustification to sup-
port legislation that allegedly interferes with individual property
rights. 4 At the same time, the legislature must respect individ-




107. GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 39.
108. Gunnar Folke Schuppert, The Right to Property, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 107, 108 (Ulrich Karpen ed., 1988).
109. Id.
110. See GLENDON I, supra note 14, at 40 (noting "[i]n theory it might seem that
cramming socialist, Biblical, and feudal notions together in the formulation of constitu-
tional property rights would involve the law in hopeless internal contradictions").
111. Kunig, supra note 87, at 197.
112. See KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 251 (noting that social justice may justify inter-
ference with individual property rights).
113. Kimminich, supra note 42, at 86.
114. KOMMERs, supra note 73, at 251.
115. Id. at 250.
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complex union of conceptual opposites - rights/duties, nega-
tive/positive, individual/communal. 1 6
b. The German Court's Jurisprudence
The German Court harmonizes these conflicting constitu-
tional demands through the institution of judicial review by
weaving together individual rights and their constraints in a co-
herent jurisprudential doctrine. 1 ' The German Court has been
required to incorporate the principles embodied in all three
clauses of Article 14,118 the contents and limits clause,11 9 the so-
cial function clause,'20 and the individual rights clause.' Fur-
ther, the German Court maintains a dual role as guardian of in-
dividual rights and as overseer of a constitutional order commit-
ted to social justice.1 22
The contents and limits clause of Article 14 appears to grant
the legislature unbounded discretion in regulating the econ-
omy.12 3 If the contents and limits of property are determined by
law, then there appears to be nothing to limit legislative power
to regulate private property and no room for judicial interven-
tion. 2 4 According to the German Court, however, the legisla-
ture, in exercising its power under Article 14, must respect two
constitutional values.125 In regulating property, the legislature
must adhere to the constitutional principle that property should
serve the common good and must pursue economic policies
designed to achieve social justice. 2 6 In addition, the legislature
must regulate property with due respect for the constitutional
value of autonomy underlying individual ownership.12 ' The leg-
islative task is to regulate private property in light of these two
116. Id. at 249-50.
117. Id.
118. GRUNDGESETZ [Constitution] art. 14 (Ger.).
119. Id. art. 14(1) ("[Property's] content and limits shall be determined by the
laws.").
120. Id. art. 14(2) ("Property imposes duties. Its use should also serve the public
weal.").
121. Id. art. 14(1) ("Property and the rights of inheritance are guaranteed.").
122. Id.; Kimminich, supra note 46, at 75-90; see Schuppert, supra note 108, at 107-
19 (discussing property rights jurisprudence in Germany).
123. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 256.
124. Id.
125. Schuppert, supra note 108, at 114.
126. Id.
127. Id.
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fundamental values, and both turn out to be constitutional
guidelines.1 28
The function of the German Court in reviewing alleged vio-
lations of individual property rights is to determine whether the
legislature has adequately considered and properly weighed the
competing values.1 9 The German Court, in fulfilling its role,
has defined property, in terms of the constitutional guarantee,
by referring to both the individual and social functions of prop-
erty recognized by the Basic Law. 3° In light of the dual function
of property, the German Court applies different gradations of
protection based on the type of property involved."3 Different
types of proprietary interests are categorized according to
whether they serve a more individual or a more social func-
tion.13 2 Types of property that contribute to ensuring the per-
sonal freedom of the individual, such as one's dwelling, form the
core of the individual's constitutionally protected property
rights.1 33 The legislative power over such types of interests is con-
comitantly curtailed.IM Types of property that serve important
social purposes, such as ownership of corporate stock, form the
outer periphery of the individual's constitutionally protected
property rights.1 35 Legislation that interferes with these types of
rights is subject to rigorous constitutional review.' 36 Thus, the
more a particular type of proprietary interest serves an individ-
ual function, and, thus, the closer it is to the core of the individ-
ual's constitutionally protected property rights, the greater the
legislature's duty to the individual. 137 The German Court re-
quires a greater degree of justification for legislation that
touches the core of an individual's property right.1 38 With re-
gard to types of property that serve a distinctively social function,
however, the legislature's duty to the public outweighs its duty to
128. Id.
129. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 264.
130. Glendon III, supra note 14, at 283-85; Fritz Ossenbuhl, Economic and Occupa-
tional Rights, in GERMANY AND ITS BASIC LAw: PAST, PRESENT AND FURTURE- A GERMAN-
AMERICAN SYMPOSIUM 251, 268-70 (Kirchhof & Kommers eds., 1989).






137. Schuppert, supra note 108, at 114-15.
138. Id.
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the individual.13 9
Under the German Court's methodology, the existing pri-
vate law is not of determinative import in defining the constitu-
tionally protected property rights of an individual."4 Individuals
do not necessarily have a constitutionally protected property
right in the proprietary interests that they claim under the pri-
vate law."' Whether the individual has a constitutionally pro-
tected right in private law entitlement depends on whether it
serves an individual or a social function. 14
2
C. Protection of Property Under the European Convention on
Human Rights
The ECJ, in defining its fundamental rights norms, also
draws upon the European Convention on the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("Convention") for
guidelines."' The Convention, which includes a Protocol that
guarantees the right to property, codifies common principles of
the signatory states with respect to fundamental rights1 44 The
legislative history of the Protocol, therefore, illuminates the sig-
natories' shared values associated with individual property
rights.' 45 Statements made by delegates to the Convention re-
flect disagreement over the scope of individual property rights
and whether, and to what extent, such rights should prevail over
139. Id.
140. KOMMERS, supra note 73, at 265. Kommers, quoting the German Constitu-
tional Court, notes:
The concept of property as guaranteed by the Constitution must be derived
from the Constitution itself. This concept of property in the constitutional
sense cannot be derived from legal norms (ordinary statutes) lower in rank
than the Constitution, nor can the scope of concrete property guarantee be
determined on the basis of private law regulation.
Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 267.
143. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfatz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727,.3745-46,
[1980] 3 C.M.L.R. 42, 64-65; European Convention, supra note 15, at 221.
144. Wolfgang Peukert, Protection of Ownership under Article I of the First Protocol to the
European Convention on Human Rights, 2 HuM. RTS. L.J. 37, 38 (1981); see R. Anthony
Salgado, Protection of National's Rights to Property Under the European Convention on Human
Rights: Lithgow v. United Kingdom, 27 VA.J. OF INT'L L. 865, 881 (1987) (discussing pro-
tection for property under Protocol); see also Peter Van Den Broek, The Protection of
Property Rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, 1 LEGAL ISSUES EUR. INTE-
GRATION 52 (1986) (discussing Protocol).
145. See Peukert, supra note 144, at 38 (discussing common traditions of European
countries that influenced debates over Protocol).
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community rights to regulate the economy." The ECJ's juris-
prudence has been, and will continue to be, influenced by the
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights ("Court
of Human Rights"), which was appointed to enforce and inter-
pret the Convention. 4 7 Thus, examining the case-law of the
Court of Human Rights provides a reference point to predict
trends that may develop in the ECJ's property rights jurispru-
dence.1 48
1. The Legislative History
Differences of opinion frustrated the inclusion of property
rights in the list of rights and freedoms set forth in the text of
the Convention.149  Opposition to including a guarantee of
property centered around hesitation to empower an interna-
tional court to review the lawfulness of limitations imposed on
private property. 50 Some delegates argued that permitting a
court to review the lawfulness of such limitations would allow the
court to define a state's economic policies. 5' A British delegate
warned that a judicially enforceable guarantee of private prop-
erty would freeze existing property structures and thereby en-
trench the social inequalities produced by those structures. 52
Further, several speakers argued if the right to ownership were
guaranteed, it must be balanced against other social rights such
as the right to a reasonable standard of living.155 To include one
without the other would create an unacceptable lack of bal-
ance.'
54
The majority of delegates determined, however, that due to
the important function of property in safeguarding the indepen-
dence of the individual, the Convention should guarantee prop-
erty rights.1 55 Some delegates feared the recurrence of injustices
146. Id. at 39.
147. Louis Henkin, Economic Rights Under the United States Constitution, 32 COLUM.J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 97, 112-13 (1994).
148. See id. (noting that jurisprudence of ECJ will be influenced by Convention
institutions).






155. Salgado, supra note 144, at 881.
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committed by totalitarian regimes before and during World War
11.156 These delegates argued that a guarantee should be in-
cluded to avoid a situation where oppressive regimes exert pres-
sure on individuals by confiscating their homes. 157 To quiet the
doubts of those that were still opposed to including property
rights, supporters suggested limiting the protection of property
to objects in personal use.1 5 8 Because of the remaining differ-
ences regarding the inclusion of property rights, the delegates
believed that the Convention should stress the social function of
ownership.
159
A Committee of Experts, appointed to consider and draft a
protocol guaranteeing the right to property, agreed on a final
text. 16 1 Considerable disagreement regarding the right to com-
pensation for expropriation made it impossible to include such a
right in the final text. 161 The final text provides that expropria-
tion shall be subject to the conditions provided for by the gen-
eral principles of international law, which only requires a state to
compensate non-nationals. 162 Some of the delegates feared that
the new provision would be construed to place limits on govern-
ment nationalization of certain industries, 163 but most were con-
fident that it did not.1" The Committee expressly stated that
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Peukert, supra note, 144, at 39.
159. Id.
160. Salgado, supra note 144, at 883.
161. Broek, supra note 144, at 54.
162. See Salgado, supra note 26, at 873-75 (discussing international principles of
compensation for expropriation).
163. Peukert supra note 144, at 39. Nationalization is the transfer to state owner-
ship of branches of industry and commerce. Id.
164. Salgado, supra note 26, at 885. To support one of the early proposals, the
French delegate noted:
We reaffirmed that property is an extension of the personality; that it
should be protected from arbitrary confiscation, that is to say, from those
high-handed administrative or private measures of which all the totalitarian
regimes have furnished such sinister examples. On the other hand we ex-
pressly reserved to each State the right to safeguard the social purpose of the
property by appropriate legislative enactments. For this reason, nationaliza-
tion laws which ... exist in France as well as England, could never be brought
before the court or the Commission and impugned before them under the
text which we are proposing.
Id. The British Labor Party wanted assurances "that this Article safeguards the rights of
any State to undertake schemes of nationalization." Id. One of the delegates replied:
I have no difficulty in giving Miss Bacon the assurances for which she asks.
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the obligation to compensate for expropriation would only apply
to relations between a state and non-nationals. 65 The different
treatment was justified on the grounds that expropriation is un-
fair to non-nationals who had no voice in the decision to nation-
alize and had no ability to enjoy the benefits resulting there-
from. 66 Nationals of a state did not need the protection af-
forded by a compensation requirement because they generally
benefitted from the state's economic policies and were able to
influence the decision to nationalize.1 67
2. Interpretations
The European Court of Human Rights ("Court of Human
Rights") has interpreted the Protocol as encompassing three dis-
tinct rules.1 68 First, the Protocol establishes the general princi-
ple of peaceful enjoyment of property.1 69 The second rule cov-
ers deprivations of property, which are subject to the conditions
provided for by international law.1 70 The third rule covers meas-
ures controlling the use of property and recognizes the power of
the states to pass laws that the state deems necessary to control
the use of property for the general good.' 71
The Court of Human Rights originally interpreted these
three rules as protecting only limited categories of proprietary
interests from Member State interferences. 72 The Protocol did
not prevent the states from expropriating the property of its own
nationals without compensation.1 7' Further, compensation to
non-nationals was only mandated in the limited case where an
With regard to Article 10A [right to property], provisions similar to this have
been included in Constitutions in countries in which nationalization has taken
place. We have precedents, and I do not think that any difficulty can arise in
this connection.
Id.
165. l& at 889.
166. Id. at 875.
167. Id. at 875.




172. See Broek, supra note 144, 53-90 (discussing interpretations of the Protocol);
see also Peukert, supra note 144, at 37-75 (discussing development of Court of Human
Rights case-law).
173. See Peukert, supra note 144, at 54-60 (discussing Court of Human Rights' ex-
propriation jurisprudence).
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individual was deprived of ownership of property.1 74 If there was
no deprivation of ownership, the measure was categorized as a
control of use of property.1 75 The Court of Human Rights did
not review the compatibility of measures controlling the use of
property with the Protocol maintaining that the state was the
sole judge of whether the public good justified the interfer-
ence. 
1 7 6
Under the earlier interpretations of the Protocol, only cer-
tain categories of proprietary interests were defined as property
as it was protected by the Protocol. 77 The right to be free from
expropriating measures passed by one's own state was not pro-
tected by the Protocol. 17  Compensation was only mandated for
non-nationals.1 79 Further, the use rights relating to private prop-
erty did not fall within the definition of property as it was pro-
tected by the Protocol.181 States were the sole judge of whether
measures controlling the use of property were justified 8
The Court of Human Right's judgment in Sporrong and Lon-
nroth v. Sweden repudiated the framework of the previous inter-
pretations of the Protocol. a82 The Court of Human Rights, in
Sporrong held that all interferences with private property must be
judged in light of the first rule of the Protocol, which enunciates
the general principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property.1 83
Under the Court of Human Right's holding in Sporrong, prop-
erty, as it is protected by the Protocol, is defined by reference to
all the proprietary interests of an individual.184
The Court enunciated a two part test to determine whether
174. Id.
175. Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1 E.H.R.R. 737 (1976). In Handyside, the
United Kingdom provided for the forfeiture and destruction of schoolbooks that were
deemed dangerous to the general interest. Id. at 739. Even though the owner was
permanently deprived of the books, the Court of Human Rights deemed the action to
be a control of use and thus permitted under the second paragraph of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1. Id. at 801.
176. Id. at 799 ("[The second paragraph of Article 1] sets the Contracting States as
the sole judges of the necessity of an interference.").




180. Handyside, 1 E.H.R.R. at 799.
181. Id.
182. Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1982).
183. Id.
184. Id.
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interferences with private property are permissible under the
Protocol. 8 First, interferences with private property must pur-
sue an aim in the general interest.186 Second, the measure must
balance the requirements of the general interest and the individ-
ual's property rights. 87 Interferences with private property must
not, with regard to the aim pursued, place a disproportionate
burden on the individual.' 8  Under the second prong of the
test, a state may be required to compensate an individual for in-
terferences with their property.8 9 At some point, the burden
suffered by the individual becomes so great that, regardless of
what the general interest requires, the interference can only be
justified upon the payment of compensation. 9 °
James v. United Kingdom provides a clear illustration of the
Court of Human Rights' approach to enforcing the Protocol. 9 '
The Court of Human Rights, in James, stated that the Member
States have a large amount of discretion in determining whether
a measure is in the public interest. 9 The Court of Human
Rights will respect the state's determination that the measure
pursues an aim in the general interest unless such determination
is manifestly without reasonable foundation. 93 In James, the
United Kingdom passed the Leasehold Reform Act which gave
tenants residing in houses under long-term leases the right to
purchase compulsorily the freehold of the property from the
landlord' 4 The United Kingdom claimed that the transfer of
property was required in the interest of social justice because the
existing system has worked unfairly against long-term tenants.'95
While the landlord had provided the property, often it was the
tenants who had built improvements at their own expense. 9 6
The United Kingdom claimed that if justice was to be done be-
tween landlords and tenants, the law should not allow the prop-




188. Id. at 26.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 30.
191. James v. United Kingdom, 8 E.H.R.R. 123 (1986).
192. Id. at 142-43.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 132-35.
195. Id. at 143-45.
196. Id.
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lord. 197
The Court, in reviewing the justification offered by the U.K,
stated that the notion of public interest is necessarily exten-
sive.198 What economic measures are in the public interest, ac-
cording to the Court, involves considerations of economic and
social issues on which opinions may differ widely." The state,
therefore, has a wide measure of discretion and the Court will
not substitute its own judgment of whether the measure is in the
public interest for that of the state's unless it is manifestly with-
out reasonable foundation. °°
The Court of Human Rights accepted, in principle, that
measures designed to ensure equitable distributions of eco-
nomic advantages can be described as being in the public inter-
est.20 1 The fairness of a system of law governing property right
between private parties is, according to the Court of Human
Rights, a matter of public concern. 0 2 Further, the Court noted
that eliminating what are judged as social injustices is widely ac-
cepted in modem democratic societies as being in the public
interest.203
Once it was determined that the measure did, in fact, pur-
sue an aim in the general -interest, the Court applied the Spor-
rong balancing test.2 0 4 According to the Court, the taking of
property in the public interest does not strike a fair balance be-
tween the public interest and the individual property owner
unless it is accompanied by the payment of compensation rea-
sonably related to the value of the property.205 A compulsory
transfer of the reversionary interest in the property from the
landlord to the tenant would, thus, upset the balance that must
be struck unless the landlord was compensated.2 06 The Lease-
hold Reform Act required the tenant to pay the landlord for the








204. Id. at 144-45.
205. Id.
206. Id.
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had been struck.2" 7
D. Case Law of the European Court ofJustice
The ECJ, in its 1980 judgment in Hauer v. Land Rheinland-
Pflaz, considered a claim that Community legislation violated an
individual's right to property.208 To date, Hauer is the most com-
prehensive statement of the ECJ's understanding of individual
property rights that are protected in the Community legal or-
der. 0 9 In Hauer, the Council of the European Communities
passed Regulation 1162/76, which prohibited landowners within
the Community from planting vine grape varieties on their prop-
erty and also prohibited the Member States from granting au-
thorization for planting such vines.210 Hauer applied to the Ger-
man authorities for permission to start growing grape vines on
her property.2 " When permission was denied, Hauer com-
menced judicial proceedings claiming that her right to property
had been violated by the Community legislation. 12
Upon examination of both the constitutional traditions
common to Member States and the provisions of the Convention
relating to the right to property, Advocate General Capotorti
concluded that the three rules of the Protocol reflect the domi-
nant tendencies of Member State constitutional traditions, and
should therefore be incorporated into the Community legal or-
der.213 Capotorti determined that even though there was disa-
greement over whether a right to compensation for expropria-
tion exists under the Protocol, the right should be recognized as
part of the property rights norm enforced by the ECJ. 14 After
establishing the content of the Community norm protecting
property rights, Capotorti viewed the threshold question as
whether the prohibition on planting of vines should be classified
as an expropriation, which would entitle Hauer to compensa-
tion, or merely as a restriction on the use of property. 5
207. Id.
208. Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfatz, Case 44/79, [1979] E.C.R. 3727, [1980] 3
C.M.LR. 42.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 3745, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 53.
211. Id. at 3741, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 44.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 3760, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 55.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 3769, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 54.
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Capotorti considered several issues relevant to answering this
question.216 The first factor is whether the measure is a perma-
nent, or merely a temporary, interference with private prop-
erty.217 A permanent interference is a necessary, but not a suffi-
cient, condition for the measure to be considered an expropria-
tion.21 ' The next factor is the diminution in property value
caused by the measure in question. 19 If the property retained
an appreciable economic value despite the legislative interfer-
ence with the property, then the measure could not be consid-
ered an expropriation. 2 0 According to Capotorti, because Mrs.
Hauer's land retained an appreciable economic value, and the
measure at issue was only a temporary interference, it could not
be considered an expropriation.22 1 Thus, Capotorti analyzed
the measure under the rule of the Protocol which permits the
state to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the
use of property in accordance with the general interest.222 Be-
cause the Protocol speaks of measures that the state deems nec-
essary, the legislature, according to Capotorti, has a broad dis-
cretion to determine whether the measure is necessary to meet
objectives of the public interest.22 3
The ECJ noted, as did Capotorti, that the second paragraph
of the Protocol permits restrictions on the use of property that
the State deems are necessary for the protection of the general
interest.224 The ECJ reviewed the substance of the measure to
determine whether the restrictions on the right to property were
proportionate to the objectives of general interest pursued by
the Community.225 According to the ECJ, the measure, in seek-
ing to promote the common organization of the market in wine,
did not entail any undue limitation upon the right to property
and, thus, met the proportionality test.2 26
The ECJ's opinion in Hauer differs in two respects from Ad-
216. Id.
217. Id. at 3760, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 55.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 3761, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 56.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 3765, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 57.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 3746, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65.
225. Id. at 3747, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 66.
226. Id. at 3748, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 68.
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vocate General Capotorti's opinion. First, the ECJ, unlike
Capotorti, did not consider whether the measure amounted to
an expropriation of property entitling Hauer to compensa-
tion.2 27 Second, the ECJ, upon concluding that the measure was
classified as a control of use, did not evidence the same level of
deference to the legislative judgment that the measure was nec-
essary to promote the general interest. 28 According to the ECJ,
measures that interfere with private property will be reviewed to
determine if the legislative justification for the measure is rea-
sonable.229
E. The Doctrine of Incorporation
In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court originally con-
strued the Bill of Rights of the U.S. Constitution as only a limita-
tion on the authority of the federal government.2 30 When a state
government allegedly violated the rights of its citizens, the ag-
grieved citizen only had recourse in the provisions of the state
constitution.231 The lack of federal constitutional restrictions on
relations between state governments and individuals was
changed after the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment. 23 2
This Amendment, enacted in the wake of the Civil War, applied
to the states by its express terms.2 3 3 Through the Due Process
Clause, the Court has applied the substantive limits of the Bill of
Rights against the states.234
227. Id. at 3746, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 65.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 3747, [1980] 3 C.M.L.R. at 67-69.
230. RONALD D. ROTUNDA, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW CASES AND NOTES 359-62
(1989). In 1833, ChiefJustice Marshall held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. Barron v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243. In Barron,
the plaintiff claimed that the City of Baltimore had 'taken' his property in violation of
the Takings Clause. Id. Marshall reasoned that "had the framers... intended [the Bill
of Rights] to be limitations on the powers of the state governments, they would have...
expressed that intention . . . in plain and intelligible language." Id.
231. ROTUNDA, supra note 230, 359-62.
232. Id.
233. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
234. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (incorporating First
Amendment against states); see also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad Co. v. Chi-
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Commentators have argued that the ECJ may be edging to-
ward a similar approach."3 5 The ECJ'sjudge-made bill of rights
would become a source for the ECJ to review Member State legis-
lation. 36 If Member State legislation violated individual rights
that had been defined by the ECJ but did not otherwise conflict
with a specific provision of Community law, the ECJ could review
the legislation and in the proper case strike it down.237
The Court's opinion in Hubert Wachauf v. Federal Republic of
Germany,238 foreshadows a willingness to incorporate fundamen-
tal rights norms developed by the Court against Member
States. 39 The Court, in Hubert Wachauf, considered a claim that
a Community regulation that assigned production quotas to
dairy farmers and the German implementing legislation violated
individual property rights. 4 ° The Community regulation made
special provisions for tenant farmers who were assigned a quota
while leasing their property, 241 allowing Member States to put
the quota at the disposal of a tenant when the lease expires. 42
This provision of the Regulation was permissive.243 The German
implementing legislation provided that upon the expiration of
the lease, the quota reverted to the lessor.244 Wachauf, a tenant
dairy farmer, who was denied use of the quota upon departing
leased property, challenged both the Community and the Ger-
man legislation as violative of his constitutionally protected
property rights. 45
cago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897) (incorporating Takings Clause against states). The Court,
however, did not originally interpret the Fourteenth Amendment as establishing any
individuals rights that could be enforced against the state. Slaughter-House Cases
(Butchers' Benev. Ass'n v. Cresent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co.),
83 U.S. (Wall.) 36 (1872).
235. See Weiler, supra note 9, at 1138 (concluding, however, that incorporation is
unlikely); see Rutili v. Minister for the Interior, Case 36/75, [1975] E.C.R. 1219, [1976]
1 C.M.L.R. 140 (applying provisions of Convention against Member States).
236. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1138.
237. Id. at 1130. Thus, the situation would be the same as that in the United States
where an individual can go to federal court and claim that state legislation has violated
his federally-protected rights. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
238. Case 5/88, [1989] E.C.R. 2609, [19911 1 C.M.L.R. 328.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2615, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 331.
241. Id. at 2612, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
242. Id. at 2616, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 331.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2617, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 331-32.
245. Id. at 2614, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 330.
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According to Advocate General Francis Jacobs, respect for
the right to property, as guaranteed in the Community legal or-
der, binds Member States when they implement Community
law."4 Thus, the German legislation, which required the quota
to revert to the landlord upon expiration of the lease, may vio-
late the right to property as recognized and protected at the
Community level by the ECJ. 4 7 Nonetheless, Jacobs considered
that the distribution of rights in the quota between tenants and
landlords was left unresolved under the Community legisla-
tion. 2 48 According to Jacobs, the Community legislation could
be interpreted as granting either the landlord or the tenant a
proprietary interest in the quota.249 The German legislation an-
swered the issue of whether or not the tenant has a proprietary
right in the quota in the negative.25° The German legislation
provided that the tenant's interest in the quota ceases upon the
expiration of the lease.25 ' Jacobs, however, argued that, if the
tenant had a proprietary interest in the quota under the Com-
munity law, then the German legislation that deprived the ten-
ant of that interest may constitute an uncompensated taking of
property in breach of the right to property.25-2 Jacobs, however,
did not find that the German legislation violated Wachauf's
property rights, because the issue of ownership of the quota was
left unresolved by the Community legislation
25
The ECJ agreed with Jacobs that the requirements of the
protection of property rights in the Community legal order are
binding on Member States when they implement Community
rules.254 According to the ECJ, legislation that has the effect of
depriving the lessee of the fruits of his labor without compensa-
tion would be incompatible with the right to property protected
in the Community legal order.255 The ECJ stated that Germany,
in implementing Community legislation, must protect the fruits
246. Id. at 2627, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 340.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2629, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 341.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 2612, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 328.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2631, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 343.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 2625, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 349.
255. Id.
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of the tenant's labor.2 6 The ECJ, like Jacobs, was not willing to
hold that the German legislation violated the tenant's property
rights. 2
57
II. THE RIGHT TO PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES:
DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY (ILLEGITIMACY) AND
CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
Two competing ideologies have, since the founding of the
U.S. Constitution, informed political discourse about, and judi-
cial interpretations of, the constitutional right to property. 258
These ideologies, republicanism and liberalism, represent con-
flicting understandings of the role of private property in defin-
ing the relationship between the state and its citizens.259 Broadly
stated, in republican thought, a publicly conceived common
good is an adequate justification for interfering with private
property;260 while in liberal thought, individual rights take prece-
dence. 61 In the last century, liberalism has been the ascendent
jurisprudential value and has overshadowed republicanism, 62
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2627, [1991] 1 C.M.L.R. at 350.
258. Alexander, supra note 3, at 273; Oakes, supra note 3, at 583.
259. William Michael Treanor, Republicanism and Takings Doctrine (May 27,
1993) (on file with Author). Professor Treanor notes that it is often misleading to think
that republicanism and liberalism denote neatly separable and unified categories that
adequately describe the complexity of ideological debates concerning property rights.
Id. at 4; Alexander, supra note 3, at 275-77. Alexander argues that historic frameworks
which compartmentalize ideologies with respect to property rights into neatly separated
conflicting camps such as republicanism and liberalism is flawed because it fails to cap-
ture the complexity of thought with respect to property rights. Id. at 276. Alexander
argues that not only did these two camps not reflect a regimented and ordered whole,
but also the two camps represented, at times, similar and often interdependent lines of
argument. Id. For the purposes of this Note, however, republicanism and liberalism
are presented as dialectic traditions representing a unified ideology for purposes of
painting broad-stroke differences in ways of thinking about property rights.
260. William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Signicance of the Just Com-
pensation Clause of the Fifh Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 699 (1985) ("[T]he sacrifice of
individual interests to the greater good of the whole formed the essence of republican-
ism.").
261. Alexander, supra note 3, 274; Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and
Constitutional Property, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEVnL-
OPMENT 127, 128 (Ellen Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1990) (noting that property
rights in liberal political thought are seen as a "form of natural right rooted in trans-
political reason"). For a discussion of the tradition behind notions of "higher law" in
U.S. legal consciousness, see generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE "HIGHER LAW" BACK-
GROUND OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1928).
262. See Treanor, supra note 259, at 27 (noting that since early 20th Century
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which has remained a sub-text.263 The early twentieth century
doctrine of substantive economic due process was the Supreme
Court's criticized interpretation of individual property rights."'
Trenchant criticisms ultimately toppled the doctrine as the para-
digm of liberal jurisprudence by exposing the inescapable polit-
ical choices supporting the Court's methodology. 65 According
to the these critics, questions of economic policy are matters for
political debate and should be decided by legislatures, not
courts.2 6 6 The insights of this criticism call into question the
democratic legitimacy of strong liberal norms protecting individ-
ual property rights.2 167 In the aftermath, attempts aimed at re-
constructing appropriate judicial roles in safeguarding individ-
ual property rights conclude that jurisprudential norms must be
grounded in the values associated with constitutional property
rights.2 68
A. Liberalism and Republicanism: Competing Constitutional Values
Liberalism and republicanism can be broadly differentiated
by the former's stratification of society into its constitutive parts
and the later's focus on community.269 In the liberal vision of
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence has been animated mostly by liberal assump-
tions); see also Michelman, supra note 6, at 1327 (noting possessive individualism has
established first occupancy in U.S. constitutionalism).
263. See Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why The Takings Issue Is Still A Muddle,
57 S. CAL. L. Rsv. 561, 593 (1984) (noting that republican tradition of civic virtue has
not vanished). Rose argues that the republican tradition persists in federal property
cases that require the "haves" to treat the "have-nots" more generously. Id. (citing
Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1077-83 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 925 (1970) (making tenant's obligation to pay rent dependent on landlord's
compliance with implied warranty of habitability)); Green v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
616, 622-29, 517 P.2d 1168, 1171-76, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 707-12 (recognizing implied
warranty of habitability in residential leases). Rose also argues that the republican tra-
dition has informed Supreme Court Takings cases in which citizens are required to
sacrifice and bear private losses in the face of a substantially greater public good. Id. at
594.
264. Michelman, supra note 5, at 1101.
265. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1335-37.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Treanor, supra note 259, at 1.
269. Lance Banning, Jeffersonian Ideology Revisited, 43 WM. & MARv Q. 3, 11-12
(1986). Banning states:
A full blown, modem liberalism... posits a society of equal individuals who
are motivated principally if not exclusively by their passion or self-interest; it
identifies a proper government as one existing to protect these individuals'
inherent rights and private pursuits. A fully classical republicanism ... rea-
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property rights, individuals have a pre-political claim of entitle-
ment to their property.2 70 Protecting the pre-political property
rights of individuals is the ends of government.2 71  One of the
chief problems in liberal thought is preventing the state from
interfering with the rights it is appointed to protect.2 72 In con-
trast, the republican vision denies the existence of pre-political
individual property rights; all such rights result from political de-
terminations reflected in law.2 73  Thus, the popularly deter-
mined common good is an adequate justification for subjugating
individual property rights.2 74
1. Liberalism and the Right to Property
Liberalism traces its roots to John Locke2 75 whose natural
sons from the diverse capacities and characteristics of different social groups,
whose members are political by nature. No republicanism will still be classical
if it is not concerned with the individual's participation with others in civic
decisions, where the needs and powers of others must be taken into account.
Liberalism, thus defined, is comfortable with the economic man, with the indi-
vidual who is intent on maximizing private satisfactions and who needs to do
no more in order to serve the public good. Classical republicanism regards
this merely economic man as less than fully human. Assuming a certain ten-
sion between public good and private desires, it will identify the unrestrained
pursuit of purely private interests as incompatible with preservation of a com-
monwealth.
Id.
270. Michelman, supra note 261, at 128. The notion of 'pre-political' property
rights was drawn from the writings of John Locke. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE ON
CVAL GOVERNMENT ch. 5 (Of Property); see CORWIN, supra note 261 (tracing history of
notion of pre-political rights).
271. Michelman, supra note 261, at 128.
272. Id. ("[In liberal thought] the central problem of the state is to keep it from
preying on the rights it is established to protect.").
273. Id.
274. Treanor, supra note 260, at 699.
275. LOCKE, supra note 270, §§ 25-32 (Of Property). Locke begins his analysis by
postulating humans in a state of nature. Id. In this state of nature, the Earth is given to
people in common. Id. There must be a way to appropriate the things of the Earth
before anything can be of beneficial use to anyone. Id.
Locke reasons that as part of personhood each individual has the power to labor.
Id. The natural wants of humankind serve as the natural stimulus to exert this power to
labor. Id. In the exertion of this power to labor upon things in a state of nature,
humans remove 'things' from the state of nature and mix them with their own labor.
Id. As the labor is the unquestionable property of the laborer, whatever a human mixes
with their labor becomes theirs by right. Id. These rights are the natural reward for
improving things in the state of nature by laboring. Id.
Locke further explains the proper foundation of government. Id. Before society,
individuals enjoyed property rights absolutely in a state of nature. Id. As individuals
acquired increased stocks of property and property became scarce, individuals needed
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law justification for property rights has had a lasting impact on
our political discourse. 276  Having its roots in natural law, the
right to property pre-exists the state and its political opera-
tions. 277 Constitutions, being creatures of the state, do not cre-
ate property rights, but instead merely recognize pre-existing
rights. 2
78
Locke posits that individuals created the state for the pur-
pose of protecting their pre-political rights to property.279 Be-
ginning with this premise, liberal political -thought maintains
that the sole justification for the existence of state power, and its
chief legitimate ends, is to protect individual property rights and
other liberties.28 ° Accordingly, when the state exercises its
power in. a manner which violates the pre-political property
protection for the property they acquired. Id. As a result, individuals joined by social
contract and created government for the purpose of protecting their rights. Id. Gov-
ernment is a necessary evil to secure the property rights of its citizens. Id.
For Locke, the law of natural reason legitimate the right to property. Id. As a
philosophic truth, this law of reason is superior to the state. Id. The right to property
pre-exists government. Id. As government was created for the purpose of protecting
individual's right to property, the legitimate end of government is to protect the right
of property. Id.
276. Treanor, supra note 259, at 1.
277. Id.
278. Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American Constitutional Law, 12 Micn.
L. REV. 247 (1914).
For the written constitution wherever found, was at first regarded as a species
of social compact, entered into by sovereign individuals in a state of nature.
From this point of view... private rights, since they preceded the constitution,
gain nothing of authoritativeness from being enumerated in it. These rights
are not, in other words fundamental because they find mention in the written
instrument; they find mention there because fundamental.
Id. at 247-48; seeJAC. Grant, The "Higher Law" Background of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L.
REV. 67 (1945) ("[Nlatural, inherent, and inalienable rights set forth in these [constitu-
tions] owe nothing to their recognition therein. As expressed by John Adams, 'There
are rights antecedent to all earthly government - rights that cannot be repealed or re-
strained by human laws - rights derived from the great Legislator of the Universe.' ").
Grant documents case law in the early 19th century that required compensation for
'takings' of property even though no such provisions were found in the state constitu-
tions. Id. at 71-81.
279. LOCKE, supra note 270, §§ 123-24 (Of the Ends of Political Society and Govern-
ment). Locke explained that man consented to relinquish his unbridled freedom in a
state of nature and to join others in civil society to preserve his property rights. Id.
Thus, the justification for the state is that individuals interested in self preservation
consented to join together and form a state. Id.; see Leslie Bender, The Takings Clause:
Principles or Politics, 34 BuFF. L. REV. 735, 754-64 (1985) (discussing Locke's theory of
justification for state).
280. Bender, supra note 279, at 756;JENNIiR NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE
LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 17 (1991).
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rights of individuals, it undermines its legitimacy.281
The framers of the U.S. Constitution who were committed
to liberalism, particularly James Madison, sought to ensure that
democratic government would not undermine its legitimacy.1
8 2
Madison believed that in a political system founded on the prin-
ciple of majority rule, individual property rights would necessar-
ily be at risk.2 13  Because individuals are endowed with unequal
faculties for acquiring property, unequal distributions of prop-
erty would be a natural part of the human condition. 84 This
would result in a division of society into different interests and
parties, or factions, with the propertyless, inevitably, in the ma-
jority.2
Furthermore, Madison believed that society is entirely frag-
mentary and is composed of individuals who are motivated prin-
cipally by self interest.28 6 Due to the self-interested nature of in-
281. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 27.
282. Id. at 16.
283. Id. at 22; THE FEDERALiST No. 10 (James Madison), reprinted in 10 JaEs
MADIsoN, THE PAPERS OFJAMES MADISON 212 (R. Rutland ed., 1977).
284. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 29.
285. Id. at 39-40.
286. Id. at 39-40; see id. at 16-66 (discussing Madison's views). Madison thought
that the major challenge that faced the Framers in designing the new republic was
protecting the right to property. Id. at 16. Madison's views were based on the notion
that property rights were a natural right of citizens and a fear that in a democratic
government factional interest would seek to violate individual's property rights. Id. at
17-18.
An important aspect of Madisonian thought was his views on the relationship be-
tween property and liberty. Id. at 28-30. Liberty, in Madisonian thought, had its roots
in natural law. Id. at 28. Included in this notion of liberty is the free exercise of man's
faculties for acquiring property. Id. In order to protect this liberty possession of prop-
erty must be protected. Id. at 30. Thus, for Madison, the protection of faculties to
acquire must involve the protection of possession. Id..
According to Madison, protecting the free exercise of man's faculties for acquiring
property would result in unequal distributions of property. Id. at 29. Men inherently
have unequal faculties for acquiring property. Id. Protecting these unequal faculties
for acquiring property would result in unequal distributions of property. Id. These
unequal distributions are justified because it results from the equal protection of man's
unequal faculties for acquiring property. Id. Thus, the inequality of distributions of
property were part of the natural order in a free society. Id.
The next important aspect of Madisonian thought is the significant threat that he
thought popular government posed to individual liberty. Id. at 25. Unequal distribu-
tions of property would inevitably result in a division of society into different interests
and parties, or factions. Id. at 18. Politics would be characterized by the struggle of
these factions to capture the powers of government to use them for their own ends. Id.
The propertied class would inevitably be in the minority. Id. Thus, the controlling
power of democratic government would rest with the propertyless majority. Id.
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dividuals, politics would not be characterized by a pursuit of an
ephemeral common good, but instead would be a struggle of
factions to capture the powers of government to use them for
their own ends.287 Because the propertyless would be in the ma-
jority, the controlling power of democratic government would
rest with the propertyless majority, 88 who, Madison feared,
would seek to use government power for redistributive ends. 89
One of the central problems was how to keep a popularly
responsive government from encroaching upon individual prop-
erty. 90 Judicially enforced property rights became the favored
prophylactic that curbed the redistributive tendencies of the ma-
jority.291 Judicial review erects a barrier between government
power and individual property rights that could not be
breached. 92
2. Republicanism and the Right to Property
In republican thought, the conception of society was en-
tirely different than the individualistic view which characterized
liberal thought. 93 According to republicanism, individuals are
Madison, thus, feared the use of government power by the propertyless majority to
interfere with the property rights of the propertied minority. Id. According to
Madison, if liberty was to survive in popular government, the use of government power
by the propertyless majority to interfere with the rights of the propertied minority must
be curbed. Id.
Madison's solution was to subordinate the political principle of majority rule to the
rules of justice which required the protection of property. Id. at 16. According to
Madison, the rules ofjustice that required the protection of property stood above the
will of the majority. Id. at 35-38. This rule of justice, not majority rule, would be the
ultimate standard of right and wrong. Id. If majority rule violated this rule of justice,
the majority could be prevented from implementing its will. Id.
287. MADISON, supra note 283, at 264; NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 23.
288. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 5.
289. Id. at 36.
290. Id. at 16. Nedelsky argues that the Framers' focus on keeping the govern-
ment from violating individual rights perverted the U.S. system of government. Id. at 1.
Nedelsky argues that the U.S. system of government has failed to achieve its democratic
potential because of the Founders* focus on individual rights. Id. For a critique of
Nedelsky's views, see Thomas W. Merrill, Zero-Sum Madison Private Property and the Limits
of American Constitutionalism, 90 Micn L. REV. 1392 (1992).
291. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 187-99. Chief Justice John Marshall used the
power of judicial review to strike down legislative action for the first time in Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (invalidating Georgia statute that repealed previous
land grant).
292. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 187-99.
293. NEDELSKV, supra note 280, at 98. Nedelsky notes thatJames Wilson stands out
among the Framers as the only one who thought that property was not the main object
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social by nature and are inextricably bound with others in polit-
ical society.29 4 Thus, society represented an organic whole, in-
stead of representing an amalgamation of individual interests.29
Reasoning from a social view of human nature, it made sense to
posit a common good that was primary to, and transcended, in-
dividual interests.296
Republican views on private property reflected this focus on
society rather than the individual.297 The unmitigated individual
pursuit of property was distrusted in republican thought.2 98 It
corrupted the individual because it lead to the placing of indi-
vidual interests before public interests.2 99 The possession of a
certain amount of property, however, was necessary for the indi-
vidual to participate in the political process.300 If an individual
of government. Id. Wilson gave priority to the political liberty of the people. Id. He
did not fear that the exercise of political liberty would threaten property in the way that
Madison thought. Id. Wilson thought that a common interest pervaded society and,
that, individuals would under the right conditions pursue this common interest. Id.
Thus, individuals would not, according to Wilson, seek to use government power to
violate the rights of other individuals. Id.
294. Treanor, supra note 259, at 4. Until recently, legal scholars have viewed early
U.S. notions of property as entirely liberal in character. Id. Recently, scholars have
argued that a second school of thought on property rights influenced U.S. political
thought. Alexander, supra note 8, at 280. This neoclassic republican tradition traced
its roots to the writings of Aristotle, Machiavelli, and other sixteenth century humanists
in Italy. Id. This tradition reached its zenith in U.S. political thought during the colo-
nial period. Treanor, supra note 260, at 699 n.18.
295. Treanor, supra note 260, at 699.
296. Alexander, supra note 3, at 280.
297. Treanor, supra note 260, at 699.
298. Treanor, supra note 259, at 5. In a letter to Madison, ThomasJefferson wrote:
I am conscious that an equal distribution of property is impracticable. But the
consequences of this enormous inequality producing so much misery to the
bulk of mankind, legislators cannot invent too many devices for subdividing
property, taking care to let their subdivisions go hand in hand with the natural
affections of the human mind. The descent of property of every kind there-
fore to all the children, to all the brothers and sisters, or other relations in
equal degree is a political measure, and a practicable one. Another means of
silently lessening the inequality of property is to exempt all from taxation be-
low a certain point, and to tax the higher portions of property in geometrical
progression as they rise. Whenever there is any country, uncultivated lands
and unemployed poor, it is clear that the laws of property have been so far
extended as to violate natural right. The earth is given as a common stock for
man to labor and live on.
Letter from ThomasJefferson to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), reprinted in THE PORTA-
BLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 395, 396-97 (M. Peterson ed. 1975).
299. Treanor, supra note 259, at 5.
300. Id. at 6. Charles Reich has revived this insight and argued for its acceptance
in modem understandings of property. Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J.
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had no property, then he was dependent on others for liveli-
hood.301 A dependent individual participating in the political
process is more likely to serve the interests of those on whom he
is dependent rather than serving the interests of the common
good.30 2
Due to the belief in a transcendent common good, republi-
can thought never accorded the same primacy to individual
property rights that characterized liberal ideology.3 13 Property
rights did not pre-exist the state as was posited by liberal ideol-
ogy, but instead had their source in the political process.30 4 As-
suming a conflict between individual rights and a politically con-
ceived common good, an individual was expected to sacrifice, ' 5
because individual rights exerted no claim of primacy over the
306political process.
B.- The Debate Over Lochner-Era Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court's substantive economic due process ju-
risprudence, called Lochner-era jurisprudence after its most
well-known case, is the paradigm of liberal jurisprudence in U.S.
constitutional law.30 7 The debate engendered by the Court's ju-
risprudence calls into question the democratic legitimacy ofjudi-
cial norms protecting individual property rights that are
grounded entirely in liberal values.30 8 Judicial enforcement of
individual property rights strips the majority of its competence
733 (1964). Reich argues that political liberty must have its basis in property. Id. at
768-74. The exercise of political rights presupposes that individuals have the means to
act independently. Id. Possession of property ensures that individuals have the means
to act independently by guaranteeing that individuals have the capacity to resist domi-
nation by others. Id. Reich uses this premise to justify the treatment of government
largess as a property right. Id. If political liberty is dependent on the possession of
property, then individuals should be ensured through government largess the minimal
amounts of property they need to remain politically independent. Id.
Michelman argues that these were the underpinnings of distributive norms with
respect to property. Michelman, supra note 262, at 1329. Distributive concerns regard-
ing property are derived from the notion that property should be distributed so that all
individuals are ensured enough property to remain independent. Id.
301. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1329.
302. Id.
303. Michelman, supra note 261, at 128.
304. Id.
305. Alexander, supra note 3, at 280.
306. Id.
307. Michelman, supra note 6, at 1327.
308. Id. at 1350.
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to implement certain types of decisions of how the economy
should be structured.3 °9  The critics of Lochner-era jurispru-
dence argued that the Court struck down legislative attempts to
implement economic policy based on its own economic policy
preferences, which would be fundamentally illegitimate from the
standpoint of democratic theory. 1° Some scholars have argued
that the lesson to be learned3 1 1 from the insights advanced by
critics of Lochner-era jurisprudence is that judicially enforced
property rights may never be anything more than economic pol-
icy making from the bench.312 Nonetheless, other scholars have
argued that courts can reconstruct a proper role in policing eco-
nomic legislation without undue affront to democratic theory.313
1. Lochner-Era Jurisprudence
During the Lochner-era, the Court incorporated the entitle-
ment defined at common law as the constitutional definition of
property rights. 31 4 The Court also aggressively enforced limits
309. Id.
310. Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and Legal Practice in the Age of American Enter-
prise, 1870-1920, in PROFESSIONS AND PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOGIES IN AMERICA, 1730-1940,
at 117 (1983). Justice Holmes, who regularly dissented in the Court's economic sub-
stantive due process cases, is the most well known advocate of this criticism known as
legal realism. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 74-75
(1973).
311. Kainen, supra note, 1, at 87. Modem attempts to revive strong judicial protec-
tion for economic rights has been framed in terms of this criticism. Id. Revitalization
of economic rights protection may depend on answering the criticism that leveled eco-
nomic substantive due process. Id.
312. Robert McCloskey, Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An Exhumation
and Reburial, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 34, 38-44 (1973). Between 1923 and 1937 the concept
of judicial supervision of economic legislation was discredited in the minds of the
Supreme Court jurists. Id. at 38. Thus, the judiciary abdicated the field of reviewing
economic legislation. Id. Thus, today, under the due process clause, the federal courts
still review economic legislation, however, the level of review is so tolerant that no law is
likely to violate it. Id.; see Gordon, supra note 310, at 117-18 (discussing growing aware-
ness of ideological tensions in judicial protection for economic rights).
313. Cass Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1689,
1700 (1984) [hereinafter Sunstein I]. Most of the following discussion of the Supreme
Court's substantive economic due process jurisprudence is based on the insights of Cass
Sunstein. See Cass Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873 (1987) [hereinafter
Sunstein II] (discussing assumptions underlying Lochner-era jurisprudence); see also
CASS SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 17.67 [hereinafter SUNSTEIN III] (discussing
legal and political developments of Lochner-era).
314. Michelman, supra note 5, at 1101 ("[T]he Court ... formalistically adopted,
as the unalterable definition of a constitutionally mandated system of property rights,
the categories and doctrines of late-nineteenth-century common law.").
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on the powers of government to alter existing distributions of
common law entitlement. 15 Hence, the period has been called
the era of laissez-faire constitutionalism. 16
a. Background.
In order to understand the effect of Lochner-era jurispru-
dence on the early twentieth-century economy, the social, eco-
nomic, and political landscape of that period must be
presented. 7 During the later part of the nineteenth century,
the popular agenda was characterized by a desire for market re-
form that would correct imbalance in economic power.3 18 Dur-
ing the late 1800's, industrial expansion created sharp economic
dislocation.3 19 As businesses became larger and more powerful,
employees' power to dictate the terms of their employment di-
minished.32 An emerging progressive movement began to push
for a more active government role in regulating the economy to
control large scale enterprises.3 21 The popular desire for reform
manifested itself in social and economic legislation designed to
mitigate the hardships associated with the new economic condi-
tions.3" This legislation sought to alter existing market condi-
tions, for instance, by imposing safety and health standards in
the workplace, establishing minimum wage, and limiting the
number of hours that an employer could require an employee to
work.3 23
Liberal theorists were suspicious of the reformist move-
ment's remedial legislation. 3 4 They feared that liberty and
property, paramount goals of the state, would never be secure so
long as regulation of the economy was left solely to the whim of
315. Sunstein I supra note 313, at 1700.
316. jAmFs W. ELY, THE GuARDIAN OF EVERY OTHER RIGHT (1992). The Court's ju-
risprudence came to be known as laissez-faire constitutionalism. Michael Les Benedict,
Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitu-
tionalism, 3 L. & HIsT. REv. 293, 293 (1985). The basic notion of laissez faire was that
government regulation of the economy was doomed to failure. Id.
317. See ELY, supra note 316, at 101-06 (discussing social and economic conditions







324. Benedict, supra note 316, at 306.
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legislative majorities."2 5 Liberal fears stemmed from the percep-
tion that, unless majoritarian reform was curbed, government
power would be used to distribute wealth to one group rather
than another solely on the ground that the beneficiaries have
used the majoritarian political process to obtain their goals." 6
Instead of being a neutral instrument of the common good, gov-
ernment power would be transformed into an instrument used
by majorities to distribute wealth for their own private benefit.117
According to liberal theorists, liberty and property would not be
secure if government powers could be used to benefit some indi-
viduals at the expense of others.3 2 "
The Lochner-era Supreme Court shared the liberal distrust
of majoritarian economic and social reform. 2 9 According to the
Court, if individual property rights were to be secure, economic
regulation could not be left solely to the whim of legislative ma-
jorities.3 0 Majorities could not be trusted to use government
power to promote the public good. 31 Thus, the Court enter-
tained constitutional challenges to economic reform legislation
and reviewed the compatibility of such legislation with individual
property rights.3 3 2
325. Id. at 311.
326. Id. at 311; Sunstein I, supra note 313, at 1689.
327. Benedict, supra note 316, at 311-12.
328. Id. at 306. Liberal theorist of the late 19th Century saw the willingness to
enact interest group legislation as the first step on the road to socialism or communism.
Id. If government powers could be used in this manner, individuals would constantly
seek to use the powers of government to distribute resources to themselves at the ex-
pense of other individuals. Id.
329. Stephen Siegal, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons Form the Controversy Over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REv. 187, 260-63 (1984); Stephen Siegal,
Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contracts Clause: The Role of the Property-Privilege Dis-
tinction and "Takings" Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 105-06 (1986).
330. See Siegal, supra note 329, at 260 (noting that Lochner-era decisions had deep
roots in liberal tradition that was fearful of government domination of society through
market intervention).
331. See Sunstein I, supra note 313, at 1690-98 (discussing substantive due process
as judicial effort to prevent abuse of government power for purely private ends).
332. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S., 161 (1908) (invalidating federal legislation
forbidding employers to require employees to agree not to join union); Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (invalidating state legislation forbidding employers to require
employees to agree not to join a union); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235
(1929) (invalidating state law regulating gas prices); Ribnik v. McBride, 277 U.S. 350
(1928) (invalidating state law regulating employment agencies); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (invalidating law restricting entry into ice manufactur-
ing business). The dissents in these cases were often vigorous. See, e.g., Coppage, 236
U.S. at 10 (J., Holmes, dissenting).
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b. Choosing the Appropriate Baseline
The Court had to determine which types of proprietary in-
terests would be protected as property for purposes of the Four-
teenth Amendment.33 Property in the constitutional sense was
not self-defining, and, thus, a theory of entitlement, or set of
distributional rules, was needed to determine which types of
legal relations would be constitutionally protected. 334 Without a
set of distributional rules, the Court could not determine who
was entitled to what.335 The Court defined constitutionally pro-
tected property rights by reference to the interest and entitle-
ment of the individual that would have been protected under
the common law rules of property, tort, and contract.3 36 Inter-
ests that would have been legally protected at common law
counted as constitutional property, and interests that would not
have been protected- did not.3 37 For instance, the right of an
employer to fire an employee at will, which would have been
protected under the common law employment at will doctrine,
was an interest that was considered by the Court to be property
in the constitutional sense. 338 The Court could then conclude
that legislation that denied an employer the right to fire an em-
ployee at will interfered with the employer's property rights. 3 9
Proceeding from this definitional starting point, the Court
333. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1099 (discussing different approaches to de-
fining property in constitutional sense); see Siegal, supra note 329, at 75-81 (discussing
changing definitions of property during nineteenth century). During the nineteenth
century, property as the term was used in the constitutional sense referred to only pos-
session. Id. By the end of the nineteenth century, a definition of property that was
limited to possession was obsolete. See Siegal, supra note 329, at 211-63 (discussing how
property came to be defined by value and not possession).
334. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1099 (discussing Court's approach to defining
property rights during Lochner-era).
335. See Michelman, supra note 3, at 1099-1102 (discussing difficulties in defining
property).
336. Id. at 1101.
337. Id.
338. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (holding that employer's right
to fire employee at will is constitutionally protected right).
339. Id. at 4. The Court noted:
It was the legal right of the [employer] to... discharge the [the employee] ...
as it was the legal right of [the employee] ... to quit the service in which he
was engaged. In all such particulars, the employer and the employee have
equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs that equality is an arbitrary
interference with the liberty of contract which no government can justify in a
free land.
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used status quo distributions of wealth and entitlement under
common law rules as the baseline for constitutional scrutiny of
economic legislation.34 ° Market legislation that altered status
quo distributions of entitlement under the common law was sub-
ject to the Court's review. 41 If, however, legislative intervention
brought about the same distributional result that would have
been obtained under the common law, the watchful eye of the
Court was temporarily diverted.342 For example, under the com-
mon law, certain harmful uses of property could be enjoined as a
nuisance."' If legislation controlled or curtailed uses of prop-
erty that were considered a nuisance at common law, then the
legislation achieved a distributional result identical to what
would have been obtained under the common law and was,
therefore, not constitutionally suspect. 3" If, on the other hand,
the regulated property use would not have been considered a
common law nuisance, the legislation altered the distribution of
entitlement that would have been obtained under the common
law, and, therefore, would be considered an interference with
constitutional protected property rights.3 45 Because property in
the constitutional sense was defined as the rights and interests of
an individual that would have been protected under the com-
mon law, status quo distributions of common law entitlement
formed a baseline that could not be altered legislatively without
the Court's approval.3 46
The Court enforced nearly absolute limits on the power of
government to alter existing distributions of wealth under the
common law baseline.347 The Court imposed strict limits on the
power of government by restricting the category of permissible
legislative ends.348 The only legitimate legislative ends, accord-
340. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 874.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 387-88 (1926).
344. Id. For a modem Supreme Court case decided under the same assumptions,
see Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Commission, - U.S. -, 112 S.CL 2886 (1992). In
Lucas, the Court held that a statute that denied a property owner of all economically
viable use of property is a taking entitling the individual to compensation. Id. at 2887.
If, however, the use of property that was regulated amounted to a common law nui-
sance, then the state would not be obligated to compensate the individual. Id. at 2900.
345. Village of Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
346. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 874.
347. Id. at 877.
348. Sunstein I, supra note 313, at 1697.
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ing to the Court 49, were to achieve goals that furthered the total
public interest.350 This seemingly unobtrusive requirement
turned out to be a sharp limitation on government power, be-
cause the definition of what was in the public interest was not
open to political determination. 3 1 The Court had its own con-
ception of what was in the public interest regardless of the asser-
tion of the legislature. 52 The Court was willing to scrutinize the
legislature's justification for market interferences, and if the
proffered justification did not comport with the Court's concep-
tion of what was in the public good, it would strike down the
legislation.353
Under the Court's conception, altering distributions under
the baseline set by the common law was not in the public inter-
est.35 4 The Court perceived such alterations as an effort to read-
just the market in favor of one party to the bargain for no better
reason than the intrinsic desirability of treating the favored party
better.355 As such, legislation that altered existing patterns of
349. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Legislation that touched the eco-
nomic rights of individuals was deemed unconstitutional unless such legislation had a
direct and substantial relation to a legitimate and appropriate government ends. Id. at
57.
350. Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45 ("[T]hese powers relate to the health, safety, morals
and general welfare of the public."). The Court in Lochner, after considering the justifi-
cations advanced by the state for the legislation at issue, decided that the legislation was
a labor law "pure and simple." Id. Regulating the conditions of labor was not within
the category of permissible public values. Id.
Richard Epstein has argued that the Lochner Court gave too much scope to the
state's police power. Richard Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the Contract Clause, 51 U.
CHI. L. Rrv. 703, 732 (1984). Epstein contends that, under some circumstances, there
is no reason to interfere with freedom of contract even for reasons of health, safety or
morals. Id.
Post-New Deal constitutionalism posits differing limitations on the category of per-
missible ends depending upon what type of rights are at stake. Compare Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. 113 (evidencing high level ofjudicial review of legislation that infringes indi-
vidual privacy) with Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (evi-
dencing low level of judicial review of legislation that infringes economic rights). If
fundamental civil rights are at stake, such as the right to privacy, the state's interest has
to be compelling. Wade, 410 U.S. at 119. When economic rights are at stake, the cate-
gory of permissible ends have been expanded to include almost any state interest. Wil-
liams, 348 U.S. at 487.
351. Sunstein, supra note 313, at 1697.
352. See Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 877-80 (discussing Court's normative theory
of which types of legislative goals were in public interest).
353. Id. at 877.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 878.
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distributions responded, in the Court's view, to purely redistribu-
tive ends356 and private interests as opposed to the public
good.357 Legislation that altered the common law baseline could
not be justified as a measure that promoted the public interest
and was, thus, constitutionally impermissible."5 8
States frequently attempted to justify legislation as remedial
measures aimed at correcting unjust conditions under the ex-
isting economic order.3 59 According to the proponents of such
remedial measures, existing distributions of wealth were some-
times unjust, and the public good demanded redistributing mar-
ket power to balance out the scales.3 6' The Court, however,
steadfast in its own conviction of what served the public good,
would not accept the legislature's characterization of these meas-
ures as serving the public good. 6 '
The Court's refusal to accept the public interestedness of
remedial legislation was supported by an assumption that com-
mon law distributions of entitlement were inherently legiti-
mate.362 By making this assumption the Court was able to view
356. See Benedict, supra note 316, at 327-31 (arguing that early twentieth century
Court struck down economic. measures in which transfer of property from one group to
another was plain).
357. See Benedict, supra note 316, at 308-09 (noting that economic legislation
came to be seen as transfers of wealth from one party to another).
358. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 877.
359. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915). The state in Coppage attempted to
justify a statute making it unlawful for employers to coerce, require, or influence em-
ployees not to join labor unions as follows:
The Kansas statute does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment but seeks fur-
ther to guarantee and protect the privileges and immunities of citizens of the
United States. In harmony with the Fourteenth Amendment, the State of Kan-
sas has said, in effect, that employers must not attempt to abridge the privilege
of their employees to affiliate themselves with labor unions. They must not
attempt to by coercion to deprive them of their property- their financial inter-
est in the insurance provided for their wives and children by such labor union.
The State of Kansas will not fold its hands and sit idly by while employers seek
to oppress and coerce their employees into a state of peonage. If all men are
to be equal within the law ... if the laboring man is to be the equal of the
corporate officer; if the wage earner is to be the equal of his employer; if the
poor man is to be the equal of the rich man; if [the Fourteenth Amendment]
is not to be distorted into a rod of oppression, then the law under which this




361. Id. at 4.
362. See SUNsrEIN III, supra note 313, at 48 ("The status of the common law as part
1995] PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 1823
legislation that aimed at eradicating a perceived injustice in the
existing market order as failing to respond to a public good."'3
If the Court did not assume that common law distributions were
inherently legitimate and, thus, challengeable as either right or
wrong, then legislation that created a new pattern of distribu-
tions would not have met the same judicial opposition."' The
Court would have been able to view such legislation as respon-
sive to the public good of remedying an injustice in current mar-
ket orderings.3 65 Only by assuming that common law distribu-
tions of entitlement were just and legitimate could the Court,
without ingenuous motivation, claim that legislative alterations
of such distributions did not, and could not, respond to the pub-
lic good."6
c. What Legitimized the Chosen Baseline?
The assumption that common law distributions were inher-
ently legitimate and just was based on an idealized vision of the
free market and the role of common law rules in structuring the
market.3 67 The Court's beliefs about the market structured by
common law rules were characteristic of the period called classic
individualism. 68 The central tenets of classic individualism were
of nature, or as in any case just, helped support the view that the common law should
form the baseline from which to measure deviations from neutrality.").
363. Id.
364. See Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 880-81 (noting that recognition that com-




367. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1728-30 (discussing early-20th century views of
common law). Legal thought from 1850-1940 has been classified as classical individual-
ism. Id. For a discussion of the descriptive assumptions underlying common law meth-
odology during this period, see EDWARD PURCELL, JR., THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THE-
ORY'. SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM & THE PROBLEM OF VALUE, 74-77 (1973). Prior to the class-
ical period, the legal community acknowledged the political character of the common
law. Id. 1725-27; Joseph William Singer, Lega Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REv. 465, 477
(1988). The common law was used during this pre-classical period to implement policy
and impose notions of fairness and morality. See MORTON HoRwrrz, THE TRANSFORMA-
TION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860, 160-73 (1977) (discussing use of contract rules dur-
ing pre-classic period to achieve commercial fairness). For instance, most individual
private relationships were defined by notions of status. Singer, supra, at 477. Once an
individual occupied a particular status, the law imposed obligations upon the individ-
ual. Id. In this sense, the law was conceived as regulating the'market to achieve specific
goals. Id.
368. See Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1728-30 (discussing era of classic individual-
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a number of inter-related normative and descriptive claims con-
cerning the relation of the common law to individual liberty and
private market activity.a6 9
During this period, an aura of scientific method was cast
about common law adjudication.37 ° The common law was the
science of individual market liberty. 371 Through deductive rea-
ism); see also Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Future of Our Past: The Legal Mind and the Legacy
of Classic Common - Law Thought, 68 IND. L. J. 743, 745 (1993) (discussing classic com-
mon law thought).
369. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1728.
The Classic position can be reduced to three propositions concerning the
proper definition of liability. First, the fundamental theory of our political
and economic institutions is that there should exist an area of individual au-
tonomy or freedom or liberty within which there is no responsibility at all for
effects on others. Second, the meaning of this political and economic theory
for private law is that there are only two legitimate sources of liability: fault,
meaning intentional or negligent interference with the property or personal
rights of another, and contract. Contract adds new duties, and these are en-
forced as a matter of right. The content of contractual duties is limited by the
intent of the parties. The third proposition is that the concepts of fault and
free will to contract can generate, through a process of deduction, determi-
nate legal rules defining the boundaries and content of tort and contract du-
ties.
Id.; Gjerdingen, supra note 368, at 745. Gjerdingen defines classic common law
thought as follows:
In the world of common law liberalism, the status quo is prima facie legitimate
and the state has no special role to play. Transactional justice dominates. If
achieved through the use of historically correct moves, the status quo and the
expectations associated with it reflect the desired state of affairs. Autonomous
individuals make bargains with each other, governed by general free market
principles tempered by the application of idealized dominant social standards.
Each person is assumed to have certain rights which preexist the state and set
baseline boundaries. The role of the state is to police individual moves within
these boundaries without interfering with the exercise of individual autonomy.
Id.
370. See HoRwrTz, supra note 367, at 253-66 (discussing assumption during period
that legal reasoning was analogous to mathematics); PURCELL, supra note 367, at 74.
Purcell notes:
Together with a formalistic, deductive concept of legal reasoning, a vague be-
lief in natural law and a rigid theory of precedent became the pervasive as-
sumptions behind American jurisprudence. That predominant legal theory
claimed that reasoning proceeded syllogistically from rules and precedents
that had been clearly defined historically and logically, through the particular
facts of a case, to a clear decision. The function of the judge was to discover
analytically the proper rules and precedents involved and to apply them to the
case as first premises. Once he had done that, the judge could decide the case
with certainty and uniformity.
Id.
371. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1728-29.
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soning, common law judges had generated a body of rules that
would facilitate the exercise of liberty by market participants. 72
Being derived as a matter of scientific method, common law
rules were entirely value free and neutral.375 These rules did not
embody value judgements about what type of market activity
should be promoted or which types of market participants
should be favored.374 Instead, the common law facilitated the
free decisions and private initiative of all individuals equally with-
out injecting value judgements into the market. 37
The market, structured by neutral common law rules, was
the bastion of individual liberty and freedom from government
interference.3 76  The government was not involved in the
processes or the workings of the market.3 77 The market was
structured by legal rules, but those rules could not, in any sense,
be considered government regulation.378  Common law rules
were not regulative because they did not structure the market to
achieve economic policy, but instead merely facilitated private
market activity.3 79 The market was regarded as a law-free institu-
tion within which all individuals had equal freedom.3 80
Under this conception, the government was not implicated
in the distributional outcomes of the market. 38 1 Distribution of
wealth in the market was viewed as the natural outcome of
purely private activity in a law-free efivironment.382 In the free
market, individuals engaged in competition for the acquisition
of wealth, and the common law rules that structured the market
did no more than recognize the entitlement to wealth that an
individual secured.18 3 The body of common law rules had no
372. See id. at 1730 ("[T]here was a single individualist moral-political-economic
premise from which everything else followed.").
373. Id.







381. Id.; Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1746-48.
382. Id. at 1746 ("[T]he outcome of economic activity within a common law
framework of contract and tort rules mechanically applied would be a natural alloca-
tion of resources and distribution of income.").
383. Singer, supra note, 367, at 481 ("Individual autonomy prevailed in the mar-
ket. Free individuals could choose to bind themselves to create secured expectations.
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distributional, effects, but recognized pre-existing claims of enti-
tlement to wealth acquired through private initiative. 84 While
there were some winners and some losers in the market, the out-
comes of the market were the natural and just result of the exer-
cise of individual liberty against a background of neutral com-
mon law rules that supported the winners in their state of hav-
ing.38 5
Given the assumptions concerning the market outcomes
under a system of common law rules, it made sense to the Loch-
ner-era Court to use status quo distributions of entitlement
under the common law as a baseline that could not be legisla-
tively altered. 86 Status quo distributions of entitlement resulted
from private initiative in a market characterized by equal free-
dom and represented a morally defensible and natural state. 87
If one was committed to the individual liberty that undergirded
the market order, then it was impossible to challenge its out-
comes as illegitimate. 8 8 Any disparities in wealth and bargain-
ing power had to be accepted as the natural order of a free soci-
ety and could not be viewed as unjust.3 8 9 Remedial legislation
that re-adjusted the market balance restricted individual liberty
for no better reason than to benefit the favored group.3 90 Such
The state would protect and enforce these expressions of autonomy as property
rights.").
384. Id.
385. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1746.
386. Id. at 1747 ("If one could believe that the common law rules were logically
derived from the idea of freedom ... it made sense to describe the legal order itself as
at least neutral, nonpolitical if not really 'natural.' ").
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 12 (1915).
390. Id. In Coppage, the state sought to justify its law on the grounds that "it was a
matter of common knowledge that employees are not financially able to be as in-
dependent in making contracts for the sale of their labor as are employers in making
contracts for the purchase thereof." Id. at 4. In other words, the public purpose as-
serted to support the law was to protect the employees from the effects of inequalities of
bargaining power. Id. The Court rejected the claim, noting:
No doubt, wherever the right of property exists, there must and will be ine-
qualities of fortune; and thus it naturally happens that parties negotiating
about a contract are not equally unhampered by circumstances ... Indeed a
little reflection will show that wherever the right of private property and right
of free contract co-exist, each party when contracting is inevitably more or less
influenced by the question whether he has much property, or little, or none;
for the contract is made to the very end that each may gain something that he
needs or desires more urgently than that which he proposes to give in ex-
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legislation could not respond to a public purpose, because there
simply was no injustice to remedy.391 In the name of liberty and
property, the Court struck down legislative attempts to readjust
existing balances of market power and, thereby, reimposed the
natural and just baseline pattern of distributions set by the com-
mon law.3 92
d. Democratic Legitimacy
During the Lochner-era, the Court thwarted much of the
popular desire for economic and social reform.393 By preventing
legislative alteration of status quo distribution of entitlement,
the Lochner-era Court took many of the questions concerning
the structure of the nation's economy out of the realm of poli-
tics.3 94 Standards for determining whether particular economic
measures responded to the public interest were judicially im-
posed and, thus, external to majoritarian will and political delib-
eration.3 95 Legislative majorities could not decide, according to
their own standards of good economic policy, what type of
economy was best suited to the public interest; the Court substi-
tuted its own conceptions of what was in the public interest for
that of legislatures.3 96
Limiting the competence of legislative majorities to deter-
mine what economic policies best promoted the common good
was, according to the assumptions under which the Court was
operating, entirely principled; the Court acted under a constitu-
tional mandate to protect property rights and its jurisprudence
was a justified attempt to preserve a private sphere of individual
change. And, since it is self-evident that, unless all things are held in common,
some persons must have more property than others, it is from the nature of
things impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the right of private prop-
erty without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of
fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.
Id. at 12. Because inequalities of fortune are legitimate, the only reason the Court




393. Benedict, supra note 316, at 293 ("These decisions permitted the Court to
frustrate efforts to secure a more just economic order in the United States until the
1930's.").
394. NEDELSKY, supra note 280, at 96-99.
395. Sunstein I, supra note 313, at 1697.
396. Id.
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freedom from government over-reaching. 39 7 The free market
structured by common law rules represented a purely private
sphere because within it all individuals were equally free.3 98 Ag-
gressive judicial review of economic regulation that sought to
reach into, and effectuate distributional changes in, the market
place erected a barrier between the government and the private
sphere.3 99 This, according to the Lochner-era Court, was princi-
pled judicial intervention in the name of individual liberty and
property rights.4 00
2. The Criticism of Substantive Economic Due Process
In the mid-1930's the Court abandoned substantive eco-
nomic due process.4 °1 Critics charged that the Court's jurispru-
dence was not principled protection of constitutional rights but
397. Benedict, supra note 316, at 305. This has not always been the accepted ex-
planation of the Court's economic substantive due process jurisprudence. Id. at 293.
Some constitutional historians had argued that the Court's rhetoric about liberty and
property was merely a subterfuge designed to conceal other more sinister purposes. Id.
These scholars argued that the major value of the Court was the protection of the busi-
ness community against government. See ROBERT McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME
COURT 115-35 (1960) (noting that "for [the Court] the problem was fairly simple: here
is the businessman whom any just-minded judge should be honored to defend; and
here is the due process clause; why not use it for that benign purpose?"). Revisionist
accounts, however, of the Court's economic rights protection in the Lochner-era have
argued that the Court's jurisprudence was a bone-fide effort to guard a sphere of indi-
vidual autonomy from government intrusion. Benedict, supra note 316, at 298; see Mor-
ton Horwitz, The History of the Public! Private Distinction, 130 UNIV. PENN. L. REv. 1432
(1982) (discussing notion of private sphere as corner-stone of liberal thought). By the
early twentieth century, the institution of private property had come to represent, in
the U.S. consciousness, the quintessential' sphere of individual autonomy. See Frank
Michelman, Possession v. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72 IowA L. REv.
1318, 1328 (1987) (noting that "[p]roperty, with its long history of naturalistic imagery
of clearly demarcated "closes", was Atlantic legal culture's very model of a private
sphere rightfully guarded against human encroachment").
398. Siegal, supra note 329, at 259-60. Siegal notes that "[i]n nineteenth-century
liberal thought, the two most important mechanisms for establishing and maintaining
the proper relation between individual and collective life were limited government and
the free market. The market allows individuals to seek their own ends without dominat-
ing others." Id.
399. Id.
400. See Sunstein I, supra note 313, at 1697 ("modern social legislation . .. ap-
peared not as an effort to promote a public value, but instead as a raw exercise of
political power by the beneficiaries of the legislation."); Benedict, supra note 316, at
328-31.
401. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). For a description of why the
Court abandoned economic substantive due process, see SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313,
at 40-67.
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instead economic policy making from the bench. Under the
weight of this criticism, the Court could no longer sustain its role
as overseer of the national economy.40 2 Once the constitutional
bulwarks against economic reform were removed, the govern-
ment began to pursue far reaching regulatory policies."°
a. Legal Realism
The decline of substantive economic due process was, in
part, a function of awareness of the internal contradictions in
the doctrine's foundations. 414 The doctrine's central premise,
that the common law baseline represents a just and natural dis-
tribution of entitlement, was criticized as indefensible by reac-
tionaries to classic legal thought, known as legal realists.4°5 The
legal realists are credited for planting the seeds of dissention in
the legal community to the Court's jurisprudence.4 6
According to the legal realists, the common law methodol-
ogy could not be described as a scientific enterprise. 40 7  Com-
mon law adjudication was not, as classic legal thought main-
tained, the process of scientifically deducing the rules that would
402. See West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 380 (West Coast is seen as case that abandoned
economic substantive due process). In post-New Deal Constitutionalism, an economic
regulation is upheld unless it has no rational relation to a state interest. See, e.g., Wil-
liams v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) ("[T]he law need not be in
every respect logically consistent with its aims to be constitutional. It is enough that
there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it. The day is gone when this Court
uses the Due Process Clause to strike down state laws, because they may be unwise,
improvident, or out of harmony with a particular school of thought."). This 'no ra-
tional relation test' means that the category of permissible state ends is broadened and
the state is accorded deference on the means used to advance those ends. Sunstein I,
supra note 313, at 1700-03.
403. Cass Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HAsv. L. REv. 421, 437
(1987).
404. Sunstein I, supra note 57, at 1697.
405. See Singer, supra note 367, at 475-500 (discussing legal realism); see also PUR-
CELL, supra note 367, at 74-93 (discussing legal realism as part of broader skepticism of
objectivity which effected developments in philosophy, science and sociology). For pri-
mary sources on legal realism, see Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv.
L. Rxv. 457 (1897); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 CoLuM. L. Rsv. 605
(1908); Felix Cohen, The Ethical Basis of Legal Criticism, 41 YALE L.J. 201 (1931); Robert
Hale, Bargaining Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43 COLuM. L REv. 603 (1943); John
Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Rv. 17 (1924); Felix Cohen, Transcen-
dental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935); Morris Co-
hen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORN'ELL L.Q. 8 (1927).
406. Singer, supra note 367, at 475-500.
407. Cohen, supra note 405, at 810.
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facilitate individual liberty.4" 8 Instead, the formulation of legal
rules necessarily required common law judges to make value
judgments regarding what types of market activity should be pro-
moted and which market participants should be favored." 9
Common law rules, instead of representing a body of neutral
rules that facilitated private activity, could only be described as
the result of judicial value judgments of how the market should
be structured and how wealth in the market should be distrib-
uted.41 °
Legal realists, arguing that common law rules were inescap-
ably evaluative, exposed the role that the government played in
the market place.4" Common law judges had defined a body of
rules that regulated private activity in the market to achieve and
implement economic policy.412 Common law rules represented
a form of government regulation and market intervention no
less than economic legislation.4"' The market was not an institu-
tion characterized by individual freedom; laissez-faire, according
to the legal realists, was an illusion.4" 4
Existing market distributions of wealth had been created by
government intervention in the form of common law rules.4 15
The common law could not merely recognize pre-existing claims
of entitlement to wealth that were acquired as a result of private
initiative in a law-free market.416 A law-free market and unregu-
408. Dewey, supra note 405, at 19.
[T]hese logical systematization of law ... with their reduction of a multitude
of decisions to a few general principles that are logically consistent with one
another while it may be an end in itself for a particular student, is clearly in
last resort subservient to the economical and effective reaching of decisions in
particular cases... while the syllogism sets forth the results of thinking, it has
nothing to do with the operation of thinking.
Id.
409. Singer, supra note 367, at 483-92.
410. Kennedy, supra note 44, at 1731-33.
411. See Singer, supra note 367, at 482-96 (discussing in detail how legal realists
exposed role of government in market).
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. See id. at 482 ("[A] free market system could not be distinguished in a signifi-
cant sense from a regulatory system.").
415. SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313, at 51 ("What people had was a reflection not of
nature or custom, but of government choices. This was always and simply as a matter of
fact. Ownership rights were legal creations.").
416. Id.
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417 tecm o alated private activity did not exist. Instead, the common law
system, through the definition of rules, distributed wealth and
entitlement in a manner that comported with judicial concep-
tions of good economic policy.418 Further, common law rules,
once defined, delegated to individuals the power to invoke the
aid of the state to secure the wealth to which they were entitled
under the common law.419 .The common law distributed to
some and denied to others based on economic policy choices.42 °
b. Baseline No Longer Considered Legitimate
Having exposed the presence of government power in the
market, legal realists argued that existing distributions of entitle-
ment between various market actors could not be regarded as
inherently legitimate. 421 The status quo was not a natural order
resulting from purely private activity, but, instead, was an entirely
contingent order resulting from public policy choices of how
wealth should be distributed.4 2 Because the proper distribution
of wealth was debatable, the set of choices that supported the
status quo could not be considered necessarily correct.4 2 3 The
set of choices supporting the status quo is only one choice
417. Singer, supra note 367, at 482.
418. SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313, at 51.
419. Cohen, supra note 405, at 12. Cohen argues:
But the law of property helps me directly only to exclude others from using
the things which it assigns me. If then somebody else wants to use the food,
the house, the land, or the plow which the law calls mine, he has to get my
consent. To the extent that these things are necessary to the life of my neigh-
bor, the law confers on me a power, limited but real, to make him do what I
want. The character of property as sovereign power compelling service and
obedience may be obscured for us.
Id.; see Hale, supra note 405, at 43.
What work we should do and how much we might consume were determined
by a process known as freedom of contract. Yet in that process there was more
coercion, and government and law played a more significant role, than is gen-
erally realized. The owner of... food or any other product can insist on other
people keeping their hands off his products. Should he insist, the govern-
ment will back him up with force. The owner of money can likewise insist on
other people keeping their hands off his money and the government will like-
wise back him up with force.
Id.
420. Singer, supra note 367, at 477.
421. SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313, at 50.
422. Id.
423. See id. ("The common law could not be regarded as the natural or unchosen
baseline. Instead its principles amounted to a controversial regulatory system.").
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among other equally plausible policy choices.424 The status quo
could, thus, be challenged as the wrong or improper distribution
of wealth.42 5
The Court, evidently aware of these insights, was no longer
willing to strike down legislation that altered the baseline estab-
lished by the status quo as violative of individual property
rights.4 26 The Court accepted that legislative redistribution of
wealth from one group to another could respond to the general
public good.4 2 7 Disparities in existing distributions of wealth
were imposed by the government in order to implement judicial
conceptions of economic policy.42 8 The economically strong
had benefitted from the system of common law rules at the ex-
pense of the economically weak.4 29 To that extent, the status
quo was created by government intervention that implemented
unjust public policy because it resulted in such sharp disparities
of wealth.4" 0 Legislative alteration of the status quo responded
to the general public good of creating a more just distribution of
wealth and correcting the results of unjust public policy.4 ' Thus,
424. See id. at 51-52 ("[P]roperty, contract and tort rules... could not be identi-
fied with liberty in an a priori way. Sometimes they disserved liberty.").
425. Id.
426. Id. at 45-47. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish is largely regarded as the case in which
the Court abandoned substantive due process. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
427. SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313, at 45-47.
428. Id. at 51-52.
429. Id.
430. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 381.
431. SUNSTEIN III, supra note 313, at 46. Sunstein explains this point by contrast-
ing the Court's opinion in West Coast with an earlier opinion, Adkins v. Childrens Hospi-
tal, which was decided while economic substantive due process was the accepted doc-
trine. 261 U.S. 525 (1923). In both cases the statute at issue enacted minimum wages
for women. SUNSrEIN III, supra note 313, at 46. In Adkins, the Court noted that
to the extent that the sum fixed exceeds the fair value of the services ren-
dered, it amounts to a compulsory exaction from the employer for the support
of a partially indigent person, for whose condition there rests upon him no
peculiar responsibility, and therefore, in effect, arbitrarily shifts to his shoul-
ders a burden which, if it belongs to anybody, belongs to society as a whole.
Adkins, 261 U.S. at 529. In West Coast the Court noted that
the exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position with
respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless against the de-
nial of a living wage ... casts a direct burden for their support on the commu-
nity. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayer is called upon to pay...
the community is not bound to provide what is in effect a subsidy for uncon-
scionable employers.
West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 381. Professor Sunstein observes:
The notion of a subsidy plays a crucial role in both cases. It is hard to make
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the Court accepted that redistributive measures could advance
the general public good. 32 Under this recognition, the Court
could no longer sustain aggressive enforcement of individual
property rights, and in 1937, the doctrine of substantive eco-
nomic due process was put to rest.433
c. Miller v. Schoene
Miller v. Schoene illustrates the Court's change in focus. 4 34 In
Miller, the Court upheld a statute requiring the destruction of
cedar trees on the grounds that the measure was necessary to
protect the infection of surrounding apple orchards.4 35  The
Court reasoned that the state was put to a choice between the
preservation of the property of the owners of cedar trees and
that of the owners of apple trees.43 6 According to the Court, if
the state had not acted on behalf of the apple growers by requir-
ing the destruction of the cedar trees, a choice, nonetheless,
would have been made. 37
The Court's change in focus can be illustrated by entertain-
ing the following assumptions.43 8 If the state has not acted legis-
latively, then the common law of nuisance would have resolved
the conflicting claims of the apple growers and the cedar tree
growers.43 9 Assuming that a common law judge held that grow-
ing of infected cedar trees in the vicinity of apple orchards did
sense of a subsidy without a baseline from which to make a measurement. We
do not say that someone who is forced to return stolen property is being
forced to subsidize the person from whom the property is stolen. Whether
someone is being forced to subsidize someone depends on who has a legiti-
mate claim to the item in question. A theory of rights, explaining who is enti-
ded to what, is thus necessary to distinguish between subsidies from simple
duties. When a person is being required to do something that he is justly
required to do, he is not being forced to subsidize anyone, but to do what he
ought to do. In Adkins, the minimum wage law exacted a subsidy to the
public from the employer. In West Coast, the failure to have a minimum wage
law, or put another way government respect for the common law, amounted
to a subsidy from the public to the employer. The 'unregulated' common law
subsidized 'unconscionable' employers.
SUNSTEIN, supra note 313, at 45-46.
432. West Coast Hotel, 300 U.S. at 379.
433. Id.
434. Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
435. Id. at 274.
436. Id.
437. Id.
438. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 881.
439. See id. (discussing implications of Miller).
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not constituted a nuisance, the court would have distributed an
entitlement to the cedar growers to continue growing despite
the harmful effect on the apple orchards. 4" If no legislation
had been passed, the state would have chosen, by definition and
enforcement of the common law of nuisance, a distribution of
entitlement that favors, cedar tree growers." 1 The state, how-
ever, by enacting the legislation, choose a different distribution
of entitlement, one that favors apple tree growers. 442 Both pat-
terns of distribution are a function of policy choices and state
power. 4 3 Given this, the Court was not willing to reimpose the
result that would have obtained under the common law of nui-
sance by striking down the legislation. 4 " There was simply no
principle by which the Court could maintain that preservation of
the status quo, defined by the common law, would better serve
the public good.445 Neither pattern of distribution, the one that
would result under the common law nor the one that would re-
sult under the legislation, was necessarily correct; neither was
more consistent with individual property rights.4 4 6
C. Professor Sunstein's Proposal: Reconstructing a Proper Role
. for Courts
It is possible to conclude that courts should not review eco-
nomic legislation in the name of vindicating constitutionally pro-
tected property rights." 7 Judicial enforcement of property
rights requires limits on the ability of government to legislatively
alter a baseline distribution of wealth. 4 4 8 Because any conceiva-
ble distribution of wealth reflects economic policy, there is no
independent reason to respect any given distribution as a natu-
ral or just order.449 The choice between preserving or altering
such distributions becomes a question of economic policy and
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or more consistent with respect to individual property rights.451
If a court were to reimpose a given distribution by striking down
legislative attempts to alter it, the court could only justify its in-
tervention as an economic policy choice in favor of the reim-
posed distribution.452
This conclusion, however, would mean the end ofjudicially
enforced property rights.45 Such abandonment is hard to justify
in light of specific constitutional texts and long-standing consti-
tutional traditions recognizing the importance of property
rights.454 Unless the commitment to constitutional courts as the
guarantors of specifically defined constitutional rights is quali-
fied, this proves unsatisfactory.455
Cass Sunstein proposes an alternative that would both avoid
undermining constitutional commitment to property rights and,
at the same time, avoid the methodological infirmities inherent
in Lochner-style analysis.456 Sunstein recommends that courts
generate a baseline through a theory of justice derived from the
animating purpose behind the constitutional commitment to
property rights.457 For instance, a court may determine that
commitment to constitutional property rights was meant to pre-
vent government interferences with the types of property that
individuals most closely associate with -their independence, such
as their home.45 Distributions of these types of property would
be a baseline that could not be legislatively altered; the legisla-
ture could not transfer an individual's home to another.45 9
Or, a court may determine that commitment to constitu-
tional property rights was meant to prevent a system of govern-
ment market regulation that caused some individuals to be with-
out minimum levels of subsistence.4 60 A pattern of wealth distri-
bution in which all individuals had minimum levels of
451. Id.
452. Id.
453. Id. at 906.
454. Id.
455. Id.
456. Id. at 907.
457. Id.
458. Treanor, supra note 259, at 28-29.
459. See id. (arguing that Takings Clause should be used to protect these types of
fundamental interests).
460. Michelman, supra note 262, at 1319.
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subsistence would be a baseline that could not be altered.46 '
Thus, if the existing system of market regulation denied such
subsistence to some individuals, the court could mandate altera-
tion of status quo distributions to reimpose the result that would
exist under this baseline.462 The important point is that the
court would not, without independent justification grounded in
constitutional values, take status quo distributions wealth as an
unalterable baseline.463 Courts would generate a baseline that
was derived directly from the Constitution."
If a court were to adopt Sunstein's proposal, enforcement of
individual property rights would be a more principled en-
deavor." 5 The animating purpose of commitment to constitu-
tional property rights is to preserve a pattern of distributions
from government alteration. 46 If a court generated a baseline
that is derived from this animating purpose, there would be in-
dependent reason to respect it.467 A baseline, so generated,
would represent the distribution of property that is most consis-
tent with commitment to individual property rights. 468 It would
not be a mere economic choice between preserving or altering
distributions of wealth that are entirely contingent and in no
sense natural.469 Instead, it would be a choice between preserv-
ing or altering a distribution of entitlement that constitutional
commitment to property rights was intended to preserve. 470 Ju-
dicial intervention to thwart a political choice to alter this base-
line would be a principled effort to preserve distributions that
are the just order envisioned by the constitution.471
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ECJ'S PROPERTY RIGHTS
JURISPRUDENCE IN LIGHT OF THE
LOCHNER DEBATE
In protecting property rights, the ECJ entertains assump-
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 882.
464. Michelman, supra note 5, at 1099.
465. Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 907.
466. Id. at 913.
467. Id. at 912.
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tions analogous to those that supported the U.S. Supreme
Court's Lochner-erajurisprudence.4 72 In light of possible analo-
gies, however, the ECJ may or may not be subject to the criti-
cisms that undermined Lochner-era jurisprudence. Those criti-
cisms were based on democratic theories of institutional compe-
tence, which maintained that economic policy making functions
should not be transferred from legislative majorities to judicial
officers as a matter of constitutional law.473 In the political oper-
ations of the European Community there are no legislative ma-
jorities on the Community level, only on the Member State level.
So, protecting property rights against infringing Community leg-
islation does not implicate democratic principles. If the ECJ,
however, begins reviewing Member State legislation using Loch-
ner-like assumptions, the ECJ will have usurped the economic
policy making role of legislative majorities.474 In such circum-
stances, the ECJ's approach must remain principled, and should
reflect Cass Sunstein's proposal for the U.S. Supreme Court.
A. The Lessons to Be Learned From the Lochner Debate
Before analyzing the ECJ's property rights jurisprudence,
three key elements of the Lochner debate that serve as depar-
ture points for worthwhile comparison must be established.
First, the criticism of the Lochner-era jurisprudence was pre-
mised on a foundational theory about the proper role of the ju-
diciary in a democracy. Second, critics maintained that the
Lochner-era Court had deviated sharply from its proper role by
preventing legislative majorities from altering a baseline fixed by
the status quo. Third, commentators have argued that the les-
sons to be learned from the Lochner debate are that choice of
an appropriate baseline is critical if courts are to maintain a prin-
cipled approach to individual property rights.
1. Foundational Theory
The criticism of Lochner was premised on a foundational
theory of the proper judicial role when enforcing constitutional
472. See supra notes 326-59 and accompanying text (explaining assumptions of
Lochner-era Supreme Court).
473. See supra notes 394-439 and accompanying text (discussing criticisms of Loch-
ner).
474. See supra notes 230-57 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of incor-
poration and its possible application in Community law).
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rights in a political system committed to democratic principles.
According to this theory, effective constitutionalism in a demo-
cratic system of government requires courts to strike a balance
between majoritarian will and individual rights. In democratic
theory, legislative majorities, as the repositories of sovereignty,
are endowed with sole and plenary authority to implement pol-
icy choices concerning such matters as the economy. To be sov-
ereign means to answer to no higher authority, except, of
course, a constitution. Recognition of constitutional property
rights necessarily places limits on the power of legislatures to im-
plement certain types of economic policy decisions. When legis-
lation that responds to majoritarian views of desirable economic
policy oversteps the bounds established by judicial norms that
protect constitutional property rights, the legislation is struck
down and majoritarian will is thwarted. In a constitutional de-
mocracy, the judiciary must mediate between a realm of individ-
ual rights recognized by the constitution and a realm of legisla-
tive authority recognized by principles of democracy.
2. What Was Wrong with Lochner?
This foundational theory made it possible for Lochner's
critics to argue that the Court had sharply deviated from its
proper role and, in so doing, transgressed democratic princi-
ples.475 The Lochner-era Court prevented legislative majorities
from altering a baseline set by status quo distributions of wealth.
The status quo, however, was not a natural or just order, but
instead was an order created as a matter of public policy and
government power. Whether the public good was better served
by preserving or, instead, altering the status quo baseline dis-
solved into questions of economic policy. The Court could not
determine, as a matter of constitutional law, which choice was
more consistent with individual property rights. The critics ar-
gued that, by preventing legislative alteration of the status quo,
the Court had usurped authority from majoritarian legislatures
based on the Court's view that it was desirable to preserve ex-
isting distributions of wealth. Instead of mediating between con-
stitutional rights and majority will, the Court, according to these
475. See supra notes 394-439 and accompanying text (discussing foundation for
critique of Lochner-era jurisprudence).
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critics, became a self-ordained super legislature that structured
the economy to suite its preferences.
3. Lochner's Lessons
Lochner's lesson is that the choice of an appropriate base-
line for protecting property rights is critical to sustaining a prin-
cipled balance between majoritarian will and constitutional
rights.47 6 If a court fixes a baseline for protecting property rights
by reference to a distribution of entitlement that does not repre-
sent a just order, the court would have usurped the role of legis-
lative majorities to make economic policy. Such an approach is
inimical to principles of democracy. If, however, the court gen-
erates a baseline through a theory of justice derived from the
constitution, the court's approach would be more principled.
Enforcing limits on legislative authority to alter this baseline pre-
serves a balance between majoritarian will and individual rights.
The court would prevent legislative majorities from altering a
distribution of wealth that the constitution prohibits the legisla-
ture from altering. The court would be mediating between ma-
jority will and individual rights which is the proper role of courts
in a constitutional democracy.
B. Can Analogies Be Drawn?
Before determining whether the ECJ's property rights juris-
prudence is subject to the criticisms that undermined Lochner,
it is necessary to establish first whether the ECJ's assumptions
concerning the appropriate baseline are analogous to those
made by the Lochner-era Court.47 7 The criticisms of Lochner
were based on the Court's improper choice of baseline, and
those criticisms would not be applicable to the ECJ unless it is
operating under the same mistaken assumptions. Because the
ECJ has only decided a handful of property rights cases, the
ECJ's assumptions concerning the appropriate baseline for anal-
ysis are not yet clear. The ECJ, in developing its approach to
fundamental rights, will be influenced by the jurisprudence of
476. See Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 883 (discussing lessons of debate over Loch-
ner).
477. See supra notes 208-57 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ property rights
jurisprudence).
1840 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1778
the Court of Human Rights. Thus, examination of the caselaw
of the Court of Human Rights affords a helpful starting point.
1. Use of Baseline by the Court of Human Rights
James v. United Kingdom4 78 illustrates the Court of Human
Rights's view of the appropriate baseline for decision. In apply-
ing the first step of the proportionality test, the Court of Human
Rights did not use a baseline set by the status quo. The Lease-
hold Reform Act altered status quo distributions of wealth be-
tween landlords and tenants. The landlord-tenant law that pre-
ceded the Leasehold Reform Act entitled the landlord to the re-
version in the property. The Leasehold Reform Act transferred
the reversionary interest to tenants. The United Kingdom
claimed that the public interest justified the transfer of wealth
because the existing system of property law worked unfairly
against the tenant. The Court of Human Rights stated that it
would not second guess the legislative judgment that considera-
tions of justice between landlords and tenants justified altering
the status quo unless it was manifestly without reasonable foun-
dation. The Court of Human Rights was unwilling to impose its
own judgment of whether the public interest would best be
served by maintaining the status quo or by altering it.
The conclusion to be drawn from such deferential posture
is that the Court of Human Rights does not assume that the sta-
tus quo is legitimate. As long as the Court of Human Rights did
not assume that the status quo was legitimate, it could not say
whether alteration or preservation of the status quo would best
serve the public interest. Thus, the state had almost complete
discretion to determine that the status quo was, in fact, unjust
and in need of alteration.
In applying the second step of the proportionality test, how-
ever, the Court of Human Rights did use the status quo as its
baseline for decision.4 79 The Court of Human Rights stated that
the transfer of the reversion to tenants, which altered the status
quo distributions between landlords and tenants, could not be
effectuated without compensating landlords. Under the Court
478. See supra notes 191-207 (discussing Court of Human Right's judgment in
James).
479. See supra notes 204-07 and accompanying text (discussing Court of Human
Rights' application of second part of proportionality test).
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of Human Right's approach, the state had almost complete dis-
cretion to determine whether the public interest was better
served by preserving or, instead, altering the status quo, how-
ever, the state could not choose to alter the status quo without
compensating the burdened individual.
Interestingly, the Court of Human Rights could have ap-
plied the balancing test in a manner that resembled the U.S.
Supreme Court's analysis in Miller v. Schoene.4 80 Miller illustrates
the Supreme Court's abandonment of the status quo baseline.
In Miller, the state had to choose between the conflicting claims
of apple growers and cedar tree growers. If the state choose not
to enact legislation favoring the apple tree growers, the common
law would have resolved the conflicting claims by distributing an
entitlement to cedar tree growers to continue growing cedar
trees despite the harmful effects on apple trees. The state,
through definition and enforcement of common law rules,
would have distributed property from one group to another.
The state choose, instead, to pass legislation that distributed
property from cedar tree growers to apple growers. By choosing
either to preserve the status quo set by the common law or to
alter it by legislation, the state would have distributed property
from one class of property owners to another. The Supreme
Court would not say that one choice constituted a taking of
property while the other choice did not.
Similarly, in James, the United Kingdom had to resolve the
conflicting claims of tenants and landlords. There were two pos-
sible choices. First, by failing to enact legislation, the United
Kingdom could decide to resolve the conflicting claims through
application and enforcement of its existing landlord-tenant law.
Under existing law, landlords were entitled to the reversion in
the property including any improvements made by the tenant.
Landlords would have the authority under existing law to call
upon the state to remove the tenant at the end of the tenancy, by
force if necessary, and the tenant would be required to forfeit
any improvements. The state would have distributed property
from tenants to landlords. On the other hand, the United King-
dom could have resolved, and did in fact resolve, the conflicting
480. See supra notes 227-39 and accompanying text (discussing Miller case); see also
Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 881 (discussing implications of Court's approach in
Miller).
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claims by passing the Leasehold Reform Act which distributed
the reversionary interest from landlords to tenants. Either way,
the United Kingdom had to make a choice, and either choice
would result in a distribution of property from one group to an-
other. According to the Court of Human Rights, only when the
United Kingdom altered the status quo was compensation
mandatory.
2. Use of Baseline by the ECJ
An important difference between the approach of the Court
of Human Rights and the approach of the ECJ concerns the se-
lection of an appropriate baseline.481 Under the first step of the
proportionality test, the Court of Human Rights defers to the
legislative judgment that altering the status quo is in the public
interest unless that judgment is "manifestly without reasonable
foundation." The ECJ, however, will defer to the legislative judg-
ment that altering the status quo is in the public interest only if
the ECJ considers thatjudgment to be reasonable. For instance,
in Hauer, the property owner, prior to the Community legisla-
tion, had the right to grow grapes on her property under Ger-
man private law relating to property use. The Community legis-
lation altered the status quo baseline set by German private law
by prohibiting Ms. Hauer from growing grapes on her property.
The ECJ, unlike the Court of Human Rights, was willing to inde-
pendently assess whether the justification offered by the Com-
munity legislature was in the public interest. The ECJ's analysis
in Hauer reflects the assumption that the status quo distribution
of entitlement under the baseline set by Member State property
rules is presumptively legitimate.
The ECJ in Wachauft8 made the same assumptions as the
Court of Human Rights in its James analysis, which applied the
second step of the proportionality test. In Wachauf Germany
had to choose between the conflicting claims of landlords and
tenants to a milk production quota. The ECJ implied that if the
Community legislation at issue granted departing tenants a pro-
prietary right in the milk production quota, German legislation
that distributed the quota to the lessor of the property would be
481. See supra notes 208-57 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ property rights
jurisprudence).
482. See supra notes 238-57 and accompanying text (discussing ECJ's opinion in
Wachauj).
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an impermissible 'taking' of property. The ECJ required Ger-
many to choose to maintain status quo distributions when faced
with a choice between two competing claimants to the same
property.
3. Is the ECJ's Jurisprudence Analogous to
Lochner-Era Jurisprudence?
Because the ECJ has only decided a few property rights
cases, only tentative conclusions can be drawn concerning analo-
gies between the ECJ's jurisprudence and that of the Lochner-
era. The ECJ, like the Lochner-era Court, takes status quo distri-
butions of wealth as its baseline for decision. Measures that alter
the status quo must be justified according to the ECJ's concep-
tion of what is in the public interest. The Supreme Court during
the Lochner-era, however, assumed that altering the status quo
could never be in the public interest. Under the Court's juris-
prudence, legislatures had no competence to alter the status
quo. The ECJ, on the other hand, has not had occasion to enun-
ciate the categories of public interests that will justify legislative
alterations of existing distributions of wealth. Thus, the catego-
ries of public interests that the ECJ accepts will determine how
much, or how little, competence legislatures have to alter the
status quo to achieve legislatively determined economic policies.
C. Are the Criticisms That Undermined Lochner-Era Jurisprudence
Applicable to the ECJ's Jurisprudence?
Having drawn tentative conclusions concerning analogies
between the ECJ's and the Lochner-era Court's methodology, it
can be determined whether the criticism that undermined Loch-
ner-era jurisprudence is applicable to the ECJ's jurisprudence.
The criticism of Lochner was premised on a foundational theory
of the proper judicial role in enforcing individual rights against
legislative majorities. Lochner's critics charged the Court with
violating principles of democracy by usurping the authority of
legislative majorities based on its own view of desirable economic
policy. Assuming the ECJ began aggressively enforcing limits on
the authority of Community legislatures to alter the status quo,
the criticisms of Lochner would not be applicable.48 Those crit-
483. See supra notes 230-57 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of incor-
poration and its possible application in Community law).
1844 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 18:1778
icisms would, however, be applicable if the ECJ enforced limits
on the authority of the Member States to regulate their national
economies.
1. Democratic Deficiency
ECJ enforcement of individual property rights against in-
fringing Community legislation is not subject to criticisms based
on democratic principles.4" 4 The democratic deficiency in the
Community political institutions is a recognized fact. The Com-
munity legislative processes are not responsive to majoritarian
will.
Given this political reality, arguments based on democratic
theory against judicial protection of individual property rights
become inverted in the Community context. 4 5 Strong judicial
protection for individual property rights, ironically, reinforces
democracy. The ECJ would be preventing Community legisla-
tion from altering status quo distributions of wealth and entitle-
ment under Member State property rules. To the extent that
the majoritarian political institutions of the Member States made
the economic policy judgments that determine distributions of
wealth under their property rules, such distributions are backed
by democratic legitimacy. The ECJ would be preserving distribu-
tions of wealth that were determined as a matter of majoritarian
policy making at the Member State level from alteration by Com-
munity legislation that is not popularly responsive. Strong pro-
tection for individual property rights against infringing Commu-
nity legislation does not threaten to thwart majoritarian desire
for economic reform. Criticisms of individual property rights
protection based on democratic principles would be inapplica-
ble in the Community context.
If, on the other hand, the ECJ remains passive in enforcing
individual property rights, Community legislation could, with im-
punity, alter the economic orders defined at the Member State
level. The passive approach to judicial review of economic legis-
lation in the context of the Community turns out to be the
greater affront to democratic principles.
The unusual correlation between strong ECJ enforcement
of individual rights and democratic principles accounts for the
484. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1117.
485. Id.
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difference in focus between European criticism of the ECJ's indi-
vidual rights jurisprudence and U.S. criticism of the U.S.
Supreme Court's jurisprudence. In the United States critics who
are leery of an anti-democratic Court argue for a more passive
judicial role in individual rights cases. European critics, leery of
a strong anti-democratic court, have focused on the apparent re-
luctance of the ECJ to take a more aggressive posture in protect-
ing individual rights.
2. Incorporation?
The danger that the ECJ may potentially incorporate its fun-
damental rights norms against Member States creates a different
relationship between principles of democracy and strongjudicial
protection of individual property rights. 486 If the ECJ began
preventing legislative majorities on the Member State level from
altering the status quo, the ECJ would be subject to the criticisms
of Lochner. The ECJ would be limiting the competence of
majoritarian institutions to implement economic policy, and
thus the ECJ's approach to protection of property rights must be
based on constitutional principle rather than economic policy
choices.
Incorporation of rights defined by the ECJ against the Mem-
ber States is a possible application of the ECJ's supremacy doc-
trine. The doctrine of supremacy holds that Member State law is
invalid if it interferes with Community law. Even though the ECJ
derives fundamental rights norms by examining Member State
constitutional traditions, those norms, once defined, become a
functional Community bill of rights. If the ECJ considers its in-
dividual rights norms to be Community law for purposes of the
supremacy doctrine, incorporation will be accomplished. Mem-
ber State law that violates those norms could thus be invalidated
by the ECJ under the supremacy doctrine.
Among the rights that the ECJ has protected in its funda-
mental rights jurisprudence, the right to property is the most
likely candidate for incorporation. The ECJ has become the en-
forcer of a single national economy.48 7 Centralizing economic
policy making requires limited economic competence of Mem-
486. See supra notes 230-57 and accompanying text (discussing doctrine of incor-
poration and its possible application in Community law).
487. Weiler, supra note 9, at 1108.
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ber State authorities. Otherwise, divergent local and regional
economic policies could potentially conflict with policies de-
fined on the federal level and, thereby, weaken the foundations
of a strong central economy. Judicial enforcement of individual
property rights against infringing Member State legislation
could be used to limit Member States' competence to imple-
ment economic policy (e.g., the Lochner-era).
Whether judicial enforcement of individual property rights
would serve the ECJ in preserving a single national economy de-
pends on its choice of baseline. If the ECJ choose a baseline set
by status quo distributions under Member State property rules,
then aggressive enforcement of individual property rights
against Member State legislation would not serve the ECJ in en-
forcing a strong central economy. There would not be a diminu-
tion in the level of Member States' regulation of their national
economies. The status quo under Member State property rules
is, after all, an economic order created by Member State regula-
tion that implements economic policy choices made at the na-
tional level. Laissez-faire is a myth, and the question is never
between government regulation of the economy and no govern-
ment regulation; the question is always what type of government
regulation. Thus, if the ECJ adopted such a baseline, the ECJ
would not be motivated to incorporate property rights against
Member States.
If, however, the ECJ took as its baseline for decision status
quo distributions of entitlement defined by Community legisla-
tion, the motivation of the ECJ to incorporate individual prop-
erty rights against Member States becomes more compelling. If
Member States altered status quo distributions by redistributed
entitlement enjoyed under a regime of Community legal rules,
the effect on Community policy would be potentially substantial.
Such redistributions may directly impede the policy goals of the
Community legislation under which the individual claims the en-
titlement.
The ECJ's approach in the Wachauf case indicates a willing-
ness on the part of the ECJ to define individual property rights
by reference to entitlement enjoyed under Community legal
rules. In Wachauf, the individual claimed a constitutionally pro-
tected property right in a milk production quota defined by
Community legislation. The ECJ noted the ambiguity, under the
Community legislation establishing the quota, concerning the
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distribution of ownership rights in the quota. The German im-
plementing legislation had already settled the issue of ownership
rights in the quota. Under the German implementing legisla-
tion, the tenant had no ownership rights in the quota. Nonethe-
less, the ECJ implied that if the Community law had granted the
tenant proprietary rights in the quota, then the German imple-
menting legislation, which distributed the quota to the landlord,
would have violated the tenant's property rights.
C. The ECJ Should Adopt Professor Sunstein's Approach
If the ECJ incorporates its property rights norms against
Member States, it must heed Lochner's lesson.488 Lochner's les-
son is that if a court takes the status quo as the baseline for deci-
sion when there is no independent reason for doing so, the
court is making a policy choice in favor of preserving the status
quo. Enforced limits on Member State regulatory competence
in the economic sphere must not be based on the ECJ's view of
desirable economic policy. Otherwise, the ECJ would have
usurped Member State competence to structure its national
economy solely because the ECJ happens to disagree with the
Member State's economic policies. Democratic principles re-
serve such policy matters to legislative majorities. If the ECJ,
however, adopts Professor Sunstein's proposal and generates a
baseline through a theory of justice derived from the animating
values of individual property rights, its approach would be prin-
cipled.48 9 The generated baseline would represent a distribution
of wealth that was mandated by constitutional prohibitions
against interference with individual property rights. It would not
be a baseline chosen by the ECJ. Instead, it would be a baseline
that the ECJ was obligated to preserve as the enforcer of individ-
ual rights.
1. No Constitutional Source
Determining the animating values of individual property
rights as they are recognized on the Community level would be
problematic for the ECJ. In the United States, there is a specific
constitutional text with an established history of judicial elucida-
488. See Sunstein II, supra note 313, at 882 (discussing lessons of Lochner).
489. See supra notes 440-64 and accompanying text (discussing Sunstein's ap-
proach).
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tion. Culling consistent values out of conflicting and diverse un-
derstandings of the U.S. Constitution is difficult, but at least U.S.
courts know where to look. The EC, on the other hand, has no
specific text of individual rights. The catalogue of rights is
found in judge made law.49° The values that animate commit-
ment to individual property rights on the Community level must
be found in the ECJ's case-law. Thus, in generating a baseline
the ECJ would turn to the values that it has enunciated in its
jurisprudence.
2. Conflicting Values
Generating a baseline through a coherent theory of justice
that is grounded in the animating values of property rights as
defined by the ECJ would appear difficult at first. The individual
functions of the social property are the two animating values of
property rights enunciated by the ECJ.41 Taken in their most
extreme form, these values are polar opposites. The values asso-
ciated with the individual element of property posit that individ-
ual rights trump community rights to distribute property in ac-
cordance with a publicly conceived common good. A baseline
generated through a theory of justice grounded in the values
associated with the individual function of property would en-
compass all ownership rights and would effectively prevent any
government action that interfered with private property. The
values associated with the social element of property, on the
other hand, posit unbounded community rights to distribute
property entitlement in a manner that reflects community con-
sensus of the proper or desirable economic order. Accordingly,
no ownership rights are bounded off from government interfer-
ences. A baseline derived from a theory of justice grounded in
values associated with the social function of property would be
devoid of content. In their most absolute form, both the values
associated with the individual and social functions of property
cannot be simultaneously recognized. The ECJ, however, must
generate a baseline through a theory of justice that gives both
values their due course. The social element is not merely a limit
490. See supra notes 28-42 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental rights
in Community).
491. See supra notes 43-52 and accompanying text (discussing European values as-
sociated with property).
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to the individual element of property, but, instead, both are
equally important animating values.
3. The ECJ Should Draw Upon the Expertise of the German
Constitutional Court
The ECJ could draw on the wisdom of Member State consti-
tutional courts, such as the German Court, that have experience
balancing the two competing values. The German Court does
not take, as the baseline for analysis, status quo distributions of
wealth under the private law.492 The German Court has stated
that the property rights of individuals cannot be defined from a
source other than the constitution. The constitution, according
to the German Court, contains an independent definition of
property rights and mandates a baseline grounded in a theory of
justice that balances both the individual and the social function
of property. The German Court identifies the types of proprie-
tary interests that are fundamental in terms of the individual
function of property. Distributions of the types of property
rights that are more fundamental form a baseline that cannot be
altered by the legislature. The German Court also identifies the
types of interests that serve the social function of property. The
legislature, in dealing with these types of interests, has more lati-
tude in altering status quo distributions to achieve economic pol-
icy.
4. Legislative History of the Human Rights Convention
An approach that would generate a baseline by identifying
the types of interests that serve the individual function of prop-
erty is what appears to have been contemplated by the delegates
to the Convention. 493 The legislative history of the Protocol sup-
ports the conclusion that the delegates originally sought to pro-
tect only certain types of proprietary entitlement. The initial op-
position to including property rights in the Convention illus-
trates a conviction of some delegates that there should be no
judicially enforceable limits on state power to define and pursue
its economic policy. The accord that made it possible to draft a
492. See supra notes 117-42 and accompanying text (discussing German Court's
approach to property rights).
493. See supra notes 149-57 and accompanying text (discussing legislative history of
Protocol).
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Protocol was founded on concern for protecting certain types of
interests and preventing particular kinds of measures abusing
those interests. For instance, many of the delegates wanted to
ensure protection for personal autonomy against oppressive
state conduct such as state seizure of family dwellings. Also,
there was agreement that taking the property of non-nationals
who did not benefit from the economy of the state and had no
say in its economic policy making was unfair. It does not appear
from the legislative history that the intent was to constrain the
state's economic decision making any further than necessary to
protect those interests. In fact, it was generally agreed that the
social function of property should be defined in the text and the
state's freedom to actualize it explicitly recognized.
5. A Place for Welfare Rights?
A third value that animates property rights as understood by
the Member States has not been recognized by the ECJ.494 Most
European countries recognize the constitutional rights of indi-
viduals to be free from the impact of existing economic condi-
tions when those conditions become onerous, so-called affirma-
tive or welfare rights. Recognizing welfare rights directly con-
flicts with the right of individuals to the entitlement that they
currently possess under the standing law, so-called negative
rights. Enforcing the rights of some individuals to be free from
want necessarily involves distributing to those individuals re-
sources that were previously owned by other individuals. Thus,
legislation that enforces the affirmative rights of some necessar-
ily interferes with the negative rights of others. Resolution of the
affirmative-negative rights conflict necessarily involves recogniz-
ing qualifications on negative rights.
The baseline used by Member State courts in protecting in-
dividual rights is generated through a theory of justice that also
recognizes the values associated with welfare rights. Such a base-
line is a distribution of wealth that represents conditions of so-
cial justice, for instance, a distribution of wealth in which all in-
dividuals have minimum levels of subsistence. Thus, if legisla-
tures impinge on the possessive rights of some individuals, the
welfare rights of other individuals can justify the interference.
494. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text (discussing concept of welfare
rights in German law).
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Member State constitutional courts balance the welfare rights of
some by recognizing necessary limits on the negative rights of
others.
Welfare rights, however, will never become part of the con-
stitutional values associated with property rights as they are pro-
tected on the Community level. The values associated with prop-
erty rights as they are protected on the Community level are the
values that the ECJ has recognized through its jurisprudence.495
Welfare rights are generally regarded as not judicially enforcea-
ble. Welfare rights emanate from specific constitutional texts
and are enforced by legislatures. The ECJ will not recognize the
values associated with welfare rights through its jurisprudence
because it will never have occasion to enforce welfare rights.
Thus, if the ECJ takes over the role of primary enforcer of
individual property rights within the Community, Member State
constitutional practice with respect to property rights will likely
be altered. Member State legislative measures that violated an
individual's negative property rights could not be defended in
terms of enforcing an equally important constitutional value,
namely the affirmative rights of the beneficiaries of the measure.
Welfare rights will simply not be part of the animating values
associated with property rights defined at the Community level.
CONCLUSION
In order to preserve the identity of the Member States' eco-
nomic order, the ECJ must not entertain the possibility of incor-
porating property rights defined at the Community level against
national legislation. The existing Member State economic order
preserves a well-defined balance between social justice and pos-
sessive rights. If the ECJ became the primary enforcer of individ-
ual rights, its definition of property rights would be enforced
Community-wide at the expense of Member State autonomy in
regulating their national economies. This development would
constitute one more unwelcome step in the continuing process
whereby national and local identities are being supplanted by an
overshadowing federal identity through judicial fiat.
495. See supra note 31-42 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental rights in
Community).
